



**South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and  
Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC)  
and  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

**Final Evaluation of  
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme  
Individual Reintegration Project Component (2009-2012)**

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAH	Action Africa Hilfe
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CAAFs	Children Associated with Armed Forces
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DEX	Direct Execution/Implementation
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICRS	Information, Counselling, and Referral System
IDDRP	Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IUNDDR Unit	Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit
IPs	Implementing Partners
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MDTF-SS	Multi-Donor Trust Fund-South Sudan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAGs	Other Armed Groups
PI	Public Information
RFP	Request for Proposals
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SNGs	Special Needs Group
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDDRC	South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
SDDRP	Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
SSR	Security sector reform
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WAAF	Women associated with armed forces
XCs	Ex-Combatants

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## Executive Summary

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme was initiated in 2005 as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed to end the longest civil war in Africa. The DDR Programme focused on the reintegration of 180,000 ex-combatants (XCs) and Special Needs Groups (SNGs) on both sides of the border (i.e. 90,000 each in the North and South Sudan). SNGs comprise children, women who worked in a non-military role, disabled and the elderly associated with armed forces and groups.

In Southern Sudan, the DDR programme aimed to contribute towards the three-year Strategic Plan for Recovery and Development (2009-2011), while recognizing the need to support Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in all recovery and developmental spheres, emphasizing the effective and sustainable reintegration of XCs. Thus, the DDR programme was intended to promote community security and social cohesion through capacity development at local and national levels to ensure the sustainability of reintegration efforts by: (i) supporting the social, economic, psychological and political reintegration of XCs and associated members; and (ii) enhancing the capacity of relevant institutions to ensure the sustainable reintegration of XCs.

In January 2009, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) launched the CPA DDR programme for a caseload of 34,000 participants. Programme implementation ended on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2012 with the closure of the reintegration activities. This final evaluation has been jointly commissioned by UNDP and the SSDDRC to assess programme achievements and draw lessons from the programme implementation that can form the basis for improvements in the planning, design and management of the upcoming DDR programmes.

This report is prepared to present the findings, lessons learned and recommendations of the final evaluation of the CPA DDR implementation. A team of independent consultants was commissioned, from the 19<sup>th</sup> of March to the 27<sup>th</sup> of April 2013, to conduct an independent evaluation of the CPA DDR Programme. The evaluation was conducted in a participatory manner involving key stakeholders. Primary data were collected by conducting key informant interviews and focus group discussions with a wide range of participants in five states (Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes and Western Bahr el Ghazal). Documents were reviewed to gather secondary data as well as guide the fieldwork of the evaluation.

### Key Findings

#### *(i) Achievement of Programme results*

In assessing programme achievements, the evaluation team adopted the project structure in which the **Scope of Services** (Information, Counselling and Referral Services; Technical Training, Life skills training, Provision of start-up kits and Provision of follow up services) were reclassified into five **Activity Results** (Reintegration of XCs and SNGs; Public Information; Special Needs Groups; Capacity Building; and Management Support) detailed below.

### *A. Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Special Needs Groups*

The actual disarmament and demobilization process in South Sudan was launched on the 10th of June 2009 at Mangala, Central Equatoria State. The contextual complexity (e.g. war ravaged economy, poor infrastructure, etc.) and political mistrust contributed to the demobilization effort achieving far below the target figure of 34,000. The demobilization process was stopped based on the recommendation of an independent verification team which found out that those demobilized were not former combatants. At the end of the demobilization process, a total of 12,525 XCs and SNGs were demobilized—they became the target group for reintegration. Based on the division of labour agreed between United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and UNDP, demobilization was done by UNMISS and reintegration by UNDP. Accordingly, UNDP was at the receiving end of the DDR process as reintegration was dependent on the results of disarmament and demobilization, hence the maximum number of people who could benefit from UNDP reintegration support could not exceed 12,525 during the CPA/DDR programme. Nevertheless, UNDP was fully responsible for planning and implementing the reintegration component of the DDR programme.

Outcome level assessment showed that the DDR Programme did not contribute significantly towards the achievement of the relevant outcomes of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2009-2012) and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (2009-2012) - namely improved environment for sustainable peace, restoration of socio-economic infrastructure, and revival of the economy. However, by assisting XCs and SNGs to get jobs or start their own business, the programme has made its own contribution towards employment generation and reintegration outcomes.

Moreover, the programme has produced better results in terms of providing XCs and SNGs with reintegration services. A very high percentage of the 12,525 demobilised XCs and SNGs have received reintegration support. Of the total demobilized, 87% received reintegration trainings, 86% obtained start-up kits, and 85% and 69% respectively benefited from first and second follow up services. Reintegration support provided beneficiaries with vocational skills that enabled them to get jobs or start their own businesses. As a result, they were able to generate new income, which helped them meet family needs including school fees for children. Provision of tool kits enhanced productive/income generating capacities of the beneficiaries (e.g. ox ploughs increased agricultural production compared to hand ploughs). On the other hand, there were those XCs who did not get jobs or start their own business mainly due to low economic opportunities; limited direct support to XCs through referrals to jobs in public and non-public organizations; lack of access to land especially in urban areas; absence of personal drive/initiative on the part of beneficiaries; etc. Besides these challenges, the weak absorptive capacity of host communities constrained the successful reintegration of XCs.

Several factors affected implementation of reintegration activities including poor road infrastructure, which did not allow swift movement of goods and services. Reaching beneficiaries was difficult as they were scattered throughout the vast geographical areas of the country, which were mostly inaccessible during the rainy season, creating the need for expensive undertakings to mobilize beneficiaries. Moreover, many XCs were not available in their designated locations and have remained in urban areas in search of basic social

services. A lack of materials in the local markets also affected programme implementation as procurement of reintegration kits could only be done abroad.

### *B. Special Needs Group*

The capacity of the SNGs Unit of the SSDDRC improved following the recruitment of two staff by the Commission and the deployment of two international and one national staff by UNDP. As a result, the SNGs Unit did an encouraging job in supporting XCs with disabilities to access health services. It traced 215 XCs with disabilities of whom 73 were screened and offered disability support of various forms. The support helped the beneficiaries overcome physical, social and psychological barriers while at the same time relieved their families from the burden of care. Although this can be considered as an important step in the right direction, it represents a small fraction of what is needed. In the opinion of the evaluators, the SSDDRC lacks the requisite institutional and human capacity to effectively deliver the medical and rehabilitation services needed by XCs with disabilities. Effective rehabilitation and health support cannot be delivered without the categorisation of XCs with disabilities into different groups based on the severity of their disabilities. As it stands now, XCs who have disabilities ranging from 2% to 100% are all put into one category and this does not give room to prioritise and attend to those with a severe disability.

### *C. Public Information (PI)*

PI served as an important instrument in the sensitisation of communities and disseminating information to attract XCs to reintegration services. A range of PI activities were undertaken targeting different groups. Correcting misconceptions held by XCs and the general public about DDR (e.g. DDR is a pension scheme) due to incorrect messages that were already sent out proved to be quite a challenge<sup>1</sup>. Some of the PI activities (e.g. drama, traditional dance, and local customs) were found to be more useful tools than others in sensitising XCs and the general public about DDR. Although PI activities have made some positive contributions to enhancing awareness of the target groups about DDR, it has generally been less effective than planned mainly due to the lack of an appropriate PI strategy for almost the entire programme period- it should be noted that the PI strategy was introduced during the final year of the programme. In addition, as a result of the large time delay between demobilization itself and reintegration many XCs relocated themselves throughout the country during this period and reaching them with information became difficult.

### *D. Capacity building*

UNDP provided capacity building support consisting of training, study tours, coaching and the development of financial and human resource management manuals, etc. UNDP staff were colocated to work with their counterparts in the SSDDRC headquarter and at state levels to facilitate skills transfer and continuous on-the-job-training. An important outcome of the capacity building support was the engagement of SSDDRC senior management and staff in annual work planning activities, directing programme activities and redesigning of the post-independence DDR Programme. However, the capacity building efforts were constrained by the absence of a capacity building strategy; high staff turnover due to a low

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<sup>1</sup> Narrowing the gap between expectation of XCs and the reality on the ground is crucial in the reintegration of XCs.

pay scale and a lack of absorptive capacities (matching skills) in the case of some of the Commission staff. Although there was some improvement in capacity, the SSDDRC would still need substantial capacity building support from partners to effectively play its leadership role in the new DDR programme.

#### *E. Management Support*

UNDP has provided significant management support to the SSDDRC at national and state levels including providing office equipment, PI equipment, vehicles, office buildings and VSATs. This management support enabled the Commission to perform its normal functions of directing DDR activities and supporting demobilized XCs. VSAT support has, for example, facilitated communication between the headquarter and state offices.

#### *(ii) Partnership*

UNDP worked in partnership with various stakeholders namely SSDDRC, donors, UNMISS and implementing partners (IPs). Relations with the SSDDRC were strained due to the centralised management structure initially established resulting in all decisions on DDR being taken in Khartoum. Consequently, the SSDDRC felt no national ownership and leadership in the programme. This situation, however, improved from early 2011 when major changes were introduced by UNDP in the management arrangement of the DDR programme, after UNDP South Sudan assumed responsibility for the programme.

Donor relations were also strained due to ineffective communication and a lack of regular oversight meetings, particularly before 2011. Partnership with UNMISS was initially difficult due to a lack of adherence to the Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (IUNDDR) arrangement, but it has improved significantly from early 2011. Relations with IPs were generally assessed as good, though there were some challenges in relation to delivery of reintegration services, tracing XCs, data management and reporting.

#### *(iii) Management and Implementation Strategy*

The governance structure provided in the project document was not fully implemented. The centralised management system adopted for programme implementation did not give autonomy to Sudan and Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (DDRC). Programme management was less effective than originally envisaged due to a lack of transparency, inadequate consultation and the absence of regular meetings. This continued until management responsibility was transferred to UNDP South Sudan and the SSDDRC in early 2011, this change allowed the two institutions to work closely together. The national oversight committee comprising the SSDDRC, UNDP, UNMISS, donors and IPs began holding regular meetings. Annual work plans were jointly developed, and approved by the SSDDRC. The programme implementation was undertaken based on the Direct Execution (DEX) modality and big international organizations were contracted as IPs to deliver reintegration services. Though their involvement expedited implementation, it did not help in creating local capacities. The involvement of local NGOs towards the end of the programme as part of the Small Grant Scheme provided flexibility, as they were able to adapt better to local conditions.



***(iv) Programme Relevance, Efficiency and Sustainability***

DDR was highly relevant to the nation, which did not require a big army. Downsizing the army and releasing resources from war efforts to developmental purposes was timely. Reintegration training skills have effectively responded to the needs of XCs who lost their livelihood due to war. The programme was not cost-effective mainly due to the low number of demobilized XCs and SNGs (12,525); a large management structure that was initially put in place by UNDP expecting a greater number of XCs (34,000); the practice of contracting and sub-contracting by IPs and difficult local context including poor roads, lack of suitable training facilities, vast geographical areas, etc. The low level of participation of line ministries, lack of technical and advisory services, and difficult economic climate affected programme sustainability.

***(v) Programme Impact***

As generation of significant impact requires time, the discussion will be only on the early indications of impact. The most important economic impact was new income earned by XCs and SNGs, which enabled them to meet basic household needs. Socially, as the beneficiaries were already living within their communities, there was no difficulty in reintroducing them into their communities. The social reintegration of XCs was constrained by lack of basic services at the local level, and the absence of a strategy to use the communities' social capital.

***(vi) Connectedness of DDR programme to the wider recovery strategy***

The evaluation showed that the DDR programme was not well integrated into the wider recovery strategy including community security, social cohesion, reconstruction and respect for human rights and rule of law in South Sudan. This was mainly a result of inappropriate project design which, among other things, resulted in the centralisation of decision making power in Khartoum. It did not provide room for UNDP South Sudan to integrate the programme with other security and recovery-related activities. Innovations that were later adopted to improve synergy and coordination of project activities (e.g. a community-based approach) did not make much of a difference. The limited scope of the programme and its closer link with UNMISS and implementing partners also weakened coordination with other security and recovery-related activities.

***Lessons learned***

A successful DDR programme requires proper and strong partnership among key players with national authorities assuming leadership and ownership of the programme. To this end, it is important to develop a realistic DDR plan that takes into account the local context and addresses the institutional and human capacity needs of national partners. Equally important is the development and execution of an effective PI strategy targeting XCs, IPs and the general public to send accurate messages and avoid the creation of unrealistic expectations. Capacity building efforts can only succeed if capacity gaps are properly assessed, a capacity building strategy developed and its implementation closely monitored, and core staff are motivated and retained. This has not been the case with the SSDDRC. Retention of the core staff is crucial to the overall success of the programme.

### ***Recommendations***

There should be no gap between demobilization and reintegration to avoid delays in implementation as well as prevent expensive undertakings to trace XCs once they are demobilized. Training programmes should be adequately tailored to the South Sudan context in order to allow beneficiaries to succeed under the prevailing economic environment. DDR programmes should provide standardised and harmonised integrated rural development training to ensure the acquisition of multiple skills for XCs to diversify livelihoods. Consolidate the community-based approach to ensure effective involvement of communities in reintegrating XCs into the mainstream of society. Enhance programme implementation and sustainability by providing technical support to national institutions at all levels. Develop a remuneration system that would allow the SSDDRC to retain its core staff.

To facilitate the provision of technical support, it is crucial to have a good coordination mechanism and management structure, with the government assuming the leadership role and UNDP continuing provision of technical and financial support to the new DDR programme. In playing this role, UNDP will be expected to be more attentive to the context of South Sudan and show the required degree of flexibility. The programme should collect good quality baseline data to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of programme results.

## 1. Introduction

This report presents the findings of the final evaluation of the DDR Programme (2009-2012), implemented jointly UNDP and the SSDDRC. The overall purpose of the evaluation was to learn from the programme implementation so that lessons can be drawn that can be the basis for instituting improvements to the upcoming new DDR programme planning, design, implementation and management. The specific purpose of the evaluation was to measure achievements, outcomes and impacts as well as evaluate the effectiveness of processes, both positive and negative. In addition, the evaluation included an analysis of synergies between DDR and human security, reconstruction and key human development dimensions which help support the achievement of the MDGs and assessed UNDP's programme coordination and enhancement of national ownership through capacity building initiatives.

### 1.1. Overview of the DDR Programme and Implementation:

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought to an end Africa's longest running and most destructive civil conflict that took an estimated two million lives and destroyed the infrastructure and social settings of the people of South Sudan and other war affected areas.

The CPA also provided political space to conduct a referendum in which the people of Southern Sudan expressed their right to self-determination, six years following the signing of the agreement. The situation (military and political) remained tense, as there were many unresolved CPA issues ranging from border demarcation, the status of Abyei, oil wealth sharing, the popular consultations on Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and national debt concerns. These outstanding issues were more than enough to cast doubt on the smooth implementation of the remaining terms of the CPA.

The DDR programme was an important element in the CPA, and both parties were committed to the implementation of a transparent DDR process, in both the North and South of the country, which would help reduce the numbers of armed forces on both sides by 180,000 soldiers as part of the transition to peace and development. This number (180,000) would include members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G), Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) and persons with disability and the elderly. These groups (WAAF/G, CAAF/G, the disabled and elderly) were designated as SNGs, and formed the base of beneficiaries in the first phase of DDR implementation. While there were several splinter groups of militias operating in support of the two parties in the conflict, the militia groups were obligated to align with either of the major parties, the SPLA or the SAF by the 9<sup>th</sup> of June 2007 to be considered for eligibility. They were designated as Other Armed Groups (OAGs).

The National DDR Strategic Plan and a National Reintegration Policy were developed in 2007 to inform the DDR programme. In accordance with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2012, the DDR programme was meant to contribute towards the Northern Sudan's Strategic Five Year Plan (2008 – 2011) and Southern Sudan's Three

Year Strategic Plan for Recovery and Development (2009-2011), both of which were meant to contribute towards the achievement of the MDGs.

The first DDR in Sudan was the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP, 2006-2008). The IDDRP aimed to gather baseline information and run pilot projects. The IDDRP was replaced by the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP, 2009-2012) referred here as CPA DDR that was intended to cater to XCs and SNGs.

The CPA DDR was officially launched in South Sudan on the 10<sup>th</sup> of June 2009 at Mangala, Central Equatoria targeting a caseload of 34,000 participants. As recommended in the National DDR Strategic Plan, the first phase prioritised the SNGs (elderly, disabled, female XCs and WAAF).

The reintegration component of the programme was implemented by UNDP in collaboration with the SSDDRC with the support of donors namely the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTR-SS), the governments of UK, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Japan. It was implemented in eight of the ten states of Southern Sudan namely Central Equatoria (CES), Eastern Equatoria (EES), Western Equatoria (WES), Lakes (LS), Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBS), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBS), Jonglei (JS) and Warrap (WS).

## **1.2. A Note on the Mid-Term Review of 2010:**

The SSDDRC and UNDP undertook a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the SDDRP in 2010 to assess progress of the on-going national DDR programme toward set goals and to provide forward looking options and considerations for strategic and programmatic adjustments reflecting on lessons learned from the start of implementation to the time of the MTR and the changing conditions on the ground. Major findings of the MTR are summarized below, and the current evaluation will focus on changes attained following the review to assess progress in the post-review implementation of reintegration activities.

- The MTR concluded that the CPA, which was a de facto a ceasefire, was an insufficient basis for an actual process of demobilization of active-duty combatants. The demobilization and reintegration support that took place was more of an expensive livelihoods support program for a limited group of people than a relevant contribution to peace and stability in Southern Sudan. The MTR stated that the programme has not been effective in terms of contributing to the reduction of military capability, military expenditure, nor to confidence building measures.
- The MTR found out that of the targeted 90,000 combatants to be demobilized in Southern Sudan, the actual number assisted by the time of the review was very low. Only less than 10,000<sup>2</sup> combatants and WAAF were demobilized and assisted in their reintegration. The DDR faced serious delays that were mostly due to a combination of a lack of willingness of the key actors to actually start to downsize their active-duty forces and to general and genuine challenges of designing and implementing such a complex exercise in a difficult environment. Actual demobilization in Southern Sudan only

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<sup>2</sup> This number of demobilized XCs and SNGs was as of October 2010

started in 2009. Its implementation and the subsequent reinsertion and reintegration support showed several disconnects between the SSDDRC, SPLA, UNMIS and UNDP.

- The team observed a general consensus that no matter what the political environment will be over the next few years, a large number of combatants would still need to be assisted in their demobilization and reintegration in Southern Sudan. The current size of the people under arms is far too much of a financial burden on the budget of Southern Sudan. The post-referendum DDR caseload in Southern Sudan could be as high as 130,000.

The Review Mission recommended a redesign of the DDR Programme prior to starting disarmament and demobilization for the second phase (active-duty SPLA). According to the review, a level of uncertainty marked the situation in the run-up to the referendum in which the people of Southern Sudan had to choose between unity with the North or independence. However, it noted that the new situation that would exist a few months from the time of the review would most likely provide an opportunity to look afresh as to whether any demobilization would be required and, if so, how that could best be organized.

The review team also devised a range of specific recommendations some of which were followed in the second half of implementation, such as the streamlining of the management process and its collocation. Most important among them were:

- Any new DDR, beyond Phase I, needs to be initiated, owned and led by the GoSS;
- An active role for the SPLA in DDR is also essential, both in linking the DDR to Security Sector Reform (SSR) as well as through starting to prepare the combatants for DDR while they are still within the force;
- Any future demobilization in Southern Sudan would be preceded by the GoSS taking the lead in developing a comprehensive and truly joint information and sensitization strategy so that the combatants and society at large know what to expect;
- Ways of dual targeting would be recommended, combining individual reintegration support entitlement with community-based assistance; but it could also be considered to replace the targeted reintegration support with some extra cash in the reinsertion package;
- All relevant actors need to build a clear reintegration perspective in their activities, right from the initial counselling and the use of the reinsertion package; and
- In any future DDR operation, the management of the process needs to be done from one single unit and with all the relevant headquarter staff based in one single location.

## 2. The DDR Programme Final Evaluation

### 2.1. Purpose

The overall purpose for the evaluation was to draw lessons from the programme implementation that can be the basis for instituting improvements to the upcoming DDR programme planning, design, implementation and management. The specific purpose of the evaluation was to measure achievements, outcomes and impacts as well as appraise processes and provide both positive and negative feedback.

In addition, the evaluation included an analysis of synergies between DDR and human security, reconstruction and key human development dimensions which help support the achievement of the MDGs. The evaluation assessed UNDP's role in programme coordination and enhancement of national ownership through capacity building initiatives.

### 2.2. Objectives

The overall objective was to assess, at the end of the Phase I CPA DDR Programme, the extent of attainment of effective and sustainable reintegration of the target XCs and its link to the wider recovery strategy, including community security, social cohesion, reconstruction and respect for human rights and rule of law in South Sudan.

Specific objectives were to:

- (i) Assess programme relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability from the design and implementation viewpoints.
- (ii) Assess the programme/project management capacity and structure of the SSDDRC, IPs and relevant GoSS bodies who took part in the coordination and management of the programme.
- (iii) Assess the effectiveness of DDR coordination and implementation, and how these have (or have not) contributed to overall progress towards Crisis Prevention and Recovery objectives.
- (iv) Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the programme by reference to the stated programme outcome and output targets.
- (v) Advise on the suitability of indicators and other verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs.
- (vi) Structure the lessons learned process to inform coordination, management and implementation of New National SSDDR Programme.

In addition to the above, the evaluation of the DDR Programme was also to:

- Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the programme by reference to the stated programme objectives and targets.
- Review the work planning processes with reference to: adequacy of annual work plans to guide programme implementation; adequacy of contractual agreements signed with IPs and whether such work plan and contracts were discussed and

agreed among the key partners (SSDDRC, UNMISS, and IPs: FAO, IOM, GIZ, the 10 NGOs involved in the DDR Small Grant Mechanism).

- Review and assess the programme implementation arrangement(s), donor coordination and monitoring and evaluation modalities of the programme.
- Identify the staff recruited for the programme, their expertise, and roles pertaining to capacity building of the SSDDRC as well as implementing partners.
- Identify major institutional, financial and operational issues that have assisted and/or constrained effective implementation of the DDR Programme.

The evaluation also aimed to identify strengths and weaknesses of the DDR Programme in light of relevant international standards and best practice in the sector, as well as the particular circumstances of the country. Finally, the evaluation forwarded recommendations for improvement in the upcoming phases of DDR, coordination, implementation and policies of DDR in South Sudan.

## 2.3. Approach and Methodology

### 2.3.1. Approach

The evaluation was conducted in a participatory manner by involving key stakeholders. The key stakeholders included SSDDRC and other line ministries at national and state levels, donors, UNDP, IPs (UN Agencies, NGOs, and CBOs), beneficiaries, and host communities. The participatory approach to evaluation was adopted to get the views and perceptions of a wider group about the DDR programme.

The focus of the evaluation was on results, namely outcomes and outputs rather than activities. The activities were reviewed as integral parts of outcomes and outputs and how they contributed to programme results. Impact of the programme was evaluated by looking at the changes produced in the social and economic reintegration of supported XCs and SNGs and the wider communities.

The study also focused on the five strategic evaluation criteria:

- **Relevance:** to measure the responsiveness of the programme to the needs and aspirations of XCs, SNGs and their host communities. It has also assessed the programme's alignment to national goals and priorities and its contribution to MDG achievement.
- **Efficiency:** to assess how well resources and inputs made available by the project are being utilised.
- **Effectiveness:** to what extent have programme objectives been achieved and how has the programme outputs contributed to achievement of outcomes?
- **Impact:** what social and economic changes, intended and unintended as well as positive and negative, were produced by the programme?
- **Sustainability:** to assess the likelihood of the changes produced by the programme being sustained after the end of the programme.

### 2.3.2. Methodology

The evaluation involved a comprehensive and in-depth analysis, and triangulation of data/information from three key information sources on South Sudan DDR Programme: DDR project documents and reports; information from stakeholders on DDR; and information and visual observation of the performance of XCs who have been provided with economic and social reintegration-support. Accordingly, the evaluation involved both document review and field visits. A brief description of these evaluation methodologies is given below.

#### **A. Document review**

The Team reviewed relevant documents to extract data and information needed to address key evaluation questions. A list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex 2.

#### **B. Field study**

The field study was conducted to gather qualitative data by administering a range of customised semi-structured research instruments which varied depending on information requirements of the evaluation and role of respondents in the project. It has involved individual interviews with key informants and focus group discussions. Key informants included XCs and SNGs, host communities, senior management and staff of SSDDRC, line ministries, UNDP, UNMISS, IPs and donors. Focus group discussions were conducted with selected beneficiaries (male/female groups) as well as host communities.

In selecting beneficiaries for key informant interviews and focus groups discussions, care was taken to, in as much as possible, ensure representation of different target groups (XCs, WAAF, SNGs), gender (males and females), geographical locations (states), and livelihood options (agriculture, livestock, small business, food processing, service, etc.). A total of 87 key informants and 67 focus groups participants contributed to the study (Please see Annex 3, for a full list of participants). The performance of XCs was also observed to assess changes produced in their business activities resulting from reintegration support.

The evaluation team visited Juba in Central Equatoria State, Torit in Eastern Equatoria State, Bor in Jongei State, Rumbek in Lake State and Wau and Mapel in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. With the exception of Bor, all other states were already included in the ToR. Bor was included to ensure fair representation of beneficiaries from different parts of the country.

The data (facts, statements, opinions, etc.) collected from different sources (document review, interviews, focus groups discussions and observations) were classified based on particular evaluation questions and were then compared to extract useful information.

#### **Debriefing session**

The evaluation team conducted three debriefing sessions on the findings and key recommendations of the DDR final evaluation with UNDP's Country Director, the UNDP Programme Management Team, and senior management and technical staff of SSDDRC.



## 2.4. Limitations of the evaluation

The following were the limitations of the study:

1. The final evaluation was initiated in March 2013, three months after the programme closure in December 2012. By the time the evaluation was conducted, almost all UNDP project staff who were directly involved in programme implementation were no longer available. Moreover, the Team did not also have the opportunity to actually observe programme activities being implemented, as they were all completed before the evaluation was initiated.
2. Following the requirements of the ToR, the Team conducted the final evaluation based on qualitative research except for those quantitative data which were extracted from various reports. As a result, the Team could not support some of its findings with quantitative data.
3. The absence of baseline data affected the evaluation, as there were no benchmarks against which actual results could be compared.

However in the opinion of the Team, these limitations do not compromise the validity of the findings and recommendations of the evaluation.

## 3. Programme achievements

The focus of the evaluation is on results (i.e. outcome and outputs) rather than activities. In doing so, the analysis evaluates the contribution of the DDR programme to UNDAF and UNDP's CPAP. A discussion on outcome analysis is presented as follows:

### **UNDAF Outcome: Peace-building**

By 2012, improved environment for sustainable peace in Sudan/South Sudan, through increased respect for rights and human security with special attention to individuals and communities directly affected by conflict.

### **CPAP Outcome:**

1. Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated.
2. Threats to human security (mines, small arms) reduced, and crisis affected groups returned and reintegrated.

### **Assessment**

The programme did not contribute much towards achieving the UNDAF and CPAP outcomes of improved environment for sustainable peace, restoring post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure and reviving the economy, although it has made some contribution towards employment generation. This was mainly because the programme did not achieve its objective of downsizing the army and releasing resources from defence to peaceful developmental activities. The contribution of the programme towards reducing threats to human security was also minimal.

Achievement of the aforementioned UNDAF and CPAP outcomes were constrained by several factors. First, although the CPA states that both parties will implement proportional downsizing of their armies, this was difficult to verify because the actual sizes of SAF and SPLA were not known. Second, there was deep mistrust on both sides and this was not a conducive environment for demobilization. Third, in addition to being ambitious, the programme was less aligned to the context of South Sudan. Fourth, the “one-country two-system” approach represented significant policy and resource challenges to the programme. In contrast, the situation on the ground was more characterised by a “one-country one-system” approach where there was a centralised programme management in Khartoum leaving literally no decision making power to the SSDDRC on DDR issues. Fifth, the involvement of line ministries both at central and state levels, as well as participation of local communities, was low. All these issues have resulted in low level of support from the GoSS and SSDDRC to the programme, which ultimately constrained programme performance.

However, the programme has produced relatively better results towards achieving its mutually reinforcing objectives. These were:

1. To provide support to 34,000 XCs and SNGs and to help them acquire civilian status, gain sustainable income and employment, and reintegrate into their communities.
2. To strengthen the individual and institutional capacity of the Southern Sudan DDR Commission at the headquarters and state levels- to ensure national ownership, leadership and sustainability of the programme.

According to the project document, the above objectives were to be achieved through the effective implementation of:

- Information, Counselling and Referral Services (*ICRS*);
- Technical Training;
- Life skills training;
- Provision of start-up kits; and
- Provision of follow up services.

During implementation, the above scope of services was divided into five activity results which formed the basis for assessing and reporting programme performance and achievements throughout the project period. These were:

- (i) Reintegration of XCs;
- (ii) Public Information;
- (iii) Support to XCs with disability;
- (iv) Capacity development; and
- (v) Management support.

Accordingly, programme achievements are assessed in terms of the above five activity results as follows:

## **Activity Result 1: Reintegration of ex-combatants**

Reintegration support comprises of ICRS, technical training (vocational, small business, and agriculture and livestock training support), life skills training (civilian training package which includes malaria prevention, HIV/AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs), child care and nutrition, hygiene and sanitation, civic education, peace-building and conflict management, river blindness, and environmental awareness), provision of start-up kits and follow up services.

Reintegration support was originally aimed at facilitating the effective and sustainable reintegration of 34,000 XCs and SNGs. Effective implementation of the reintegration process was dependent on the progress of Disarmament and Demobilization. In this programme, disarmament and demobilization were the responsibilities of the SPLA and UNMISS, respectively while reintegration was done by UNDP.

The demobilization process in Southern Sudan began in June 2009 mainly targeting WAAF, women XCs, elderly and XCs with disability. Thousands of beneficiaries went through the demobilization process and benefited from programme support. However, to verify whether those who were going through the demobilization process were the right people an independent verification team was established. After having completed its study, the team reported that those who were going through the system were not the right people. Consequently, the process was stopped in April 2011 after demobilising 12,525 people (51% females). This limited the total number of XCs and SNGs who could access reintegration services to 12,525, far below the original target (37%) of 34,000.

This low number of demobilized XCs and SNGs constrained programme achievement, efficiency and effectiveness. However, by providing reintegration support (i.e. training packages, start-up kits granted based on selected livelihood options, and two follow ups to assess progress made by XCs after receiving the tool kits) to these groups, the programme has helped beneficiaries acquire skills and productive assets, which enabled them either to get employment or start their own business. In the absence of quantitative data, it is difficult to give the percentage of beneficiaries who were (self-) employed, though key informants indicated it to be in the range of 60-70% including those engaged in farming and livestock production.

The remaining beneficiaries did not get jobs or start their own businesses. A number of factors contributed to this: (i) a lack of economic opportunities; (ii) a lack of entrepreneurial skills; (iii) a lack of access to land and prohibitively expensive rent in urban areas; and (iv) market dominance by well-established entrepreneurs from neighbouring countries.

Not all XCs who were demobilized continued with the programme up to the last stage. There were some dropouts as can be seen from the table below. Of the total demobilized, for example, only 87% completed reintegration training with the remaining going to the list of missing XCs.

**Table 2: Number and percentage of XCs who received reintegration support**

Type of Services provided	Number of XCs	% of total demobilized
Demobilised	12,525	100%
Received ICRS services	12,336	98%
Registered for reintegration	12,020	96%
Completed training	10,866	87%
Provided start up kits	10,750	86%
Received one follow up	10,646	85%
Received two follow ups	8,512	69%

During the reintegration process, beneficiaries were observed shifting from one livelihood option to another and this has created significant challenge to IPs. This can be explained in terms of the inadequate counselling service provided during the demobilization process. The time given for counselling was clearly inadequate, lasting from five to forty-five minutes per XC. Caseworkers were at times required to process 100 XCs per day, and as a result, they could not offer professional and personalised counselling services. When beneficiaries were given a second chance to select a livelihood option during the reintegration process, most of them chose a different option. The evaluation also revealed that some beneficiaries avoided certain livelihood options (e.g. agriculture) due to their preference to stay in urban areas where there is a relatively better level of basic services.

Reintegration trainings comprised of teaching small business, vocational and agriculture and livestock skills. Most of those interviewed expressed their satisfaction with the quality of trainings offered and the capacity of trainers. However, the outcome of the reintegration training was influenced by a number of factors such as high illiteracy level among the trainees, language barrier (translation was needed at times from English to Arabic and then to Dinka), long distance of training facilities to areas of residence compounded by lack of affordable transport, unsuitable training period (e.g. during cultivation/rainy season), short duration (mostly 2-3 months) and a lack of standardisation and harmonisation of training curriculum, duration, approach, learning environment and DSA provided.

Start-up kits were provided to beneficiaries based on the type of trainings attended. The quality of start-up kits provided to beneficiaries however varied between the IPs. For example, in Eastern Equatoria, Action Africa Hilfe (AAH) fared better than other IPs in relation to the quality of kits distributed. Delay in the provision of tool kits was common across states and IPs, and this caused resentment on the part of the beneficiaries. In most cases, the problem was outside the control of IPs as the required items were in short supply in the local market. IPs were usually under time pressure to make these kits available by graduation day. This became more challenging when the items had to be imported from foreign sources. Local purchases (e.g. procurement of bulls) also had their own problems related to supply shortages. All of these logistical problems resulted in late or incomplete deliveries of tool kits, which was not well received by the beneficiaries.

Programme implementation was slow, which resulted in increased overall programme costs. The major reasons for slow programme implementation were:

- (a) A significant time gap between demobilization and reintegration which happened at the initial stage;
- (b) Low level of orientation and awareness of XCs, communities and stakeholders about the programme;
- (c) Widely scattered beneficiaries;
- (d) Inadequate planning and execution of PI;
- (e) Centralisation of reintegration services in the states;
- (f) Insecurity in some states;
- (g) Poor road infrastructure;
- (h) Understaffed DDR commission offices in the states; and
- (i) The perception of XCs that they deserve good compensation for their services during the war.

### **Activity Result 2: Public Information (PI)**

PI activities were carried out to inform the population in general and XCs in particular on what the programme intended to offer as well as send clear messages to various groups about the DDR programme. Significant PI efforts were made to rectify the negative effects of the wrong messages that were already sent out, which created misconceptions about the DDR programme among XCs and the general public. Accordingly, a range of PI activities including DDR briefing materials, radio talk shows, DDR dispatch and newsletters, sensitisation workshops, town criers, etc. aimed to disseminate key messages on DDR, disability, community security and peace-building were undertaken. In addition to improving public information, PI activities helped in tracing missing XCs (670) who dropped out of the reintegration process at various stages and were out of the programme for a long time. An additional 106 XCs with disability were also traced and assisted to access health care/rehabilitation service.

Despite these positive results, PI still seemed insufficient in addressing XCs' information needs due to many of the challenges in the country. This was partly due to the lack of a well-designed public information strategy to guide all PI activities. In addition, rural areas were inaccessible during the rainy season and reaching them through telecommunication networks was not possible as there were no functional networks of antennae for radios and telephone services. Individual inability of XCs in affording necessary equipment for communications added to the PI challenges. The poor road infrastructure in the country made it difficult to access remote areas in some states. The rainy season presented special challenges in states like Jonglei, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Upper Nile, where activities were greatly reduced. The continued insecurity in several parts of the country created a major PI challenges as areas could not be accessed with the available means to execute PI activities. The low level of involvement of traditional leaders/chiefs in PI activities was another programme weakness.

### **Activity Result 3: Support to SNGs**

Depending on its severity, disability has significant economic, social, and emotional impact on XCs and their families. To alleviate this, the programme provided medical and rehabilitation support to XCs with disabilities to help them overcome these barriers so that they would be able to engage in livelihood activities. The capacity of the SNGs Unit of the SSDDRC was strengthened during the second half of the programme period when the Commission hired two staff and UNDP deployed two international and one national staff.

As a result, the SNGs Unit of the SSDDRC was able to assist XCs with disabilities in accessing medical and rehabilitation services. The Unit targeted 509 XCs with disability of whom 215 were traced including 143 who were screened and offered disability support comprising transportation to and treatment in Juba. Of the 143 XCs with disabilities, 73 have received rehabilitation and medical support; 42 received physical rehabilitation support; 30 were given support for sight problems; and 1 received mental health support.

Due to the low outreach level, the majority of those who accessed this support were XCs from urban areas. Moreover, the planned activities were not fully undertaken mainly due to:

- (a) communication problems between the SSDDRC head quarter and state offices;
- (b) limited tracing activities which was done only in some states;
- (c) accommodation and transport problems as beneficiaries have to stay in Juba for a couple of weeks for treatment and recovery;
- (d) late arrival of UNDP experts; and
- (e) delays in contracting IPs for rehabilitation services.

Clearly, those supported by the programme were greatly assisted to overcome their physical, social and psychological barriers (e.g. mobility problems, emotional problems, feeling of isolation, etc.). Their families were also satisfied as it relieved them from the burden of giving continuous care to disabled persons (e.g. eye problems). Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Team, the SDDRC was not well resourced in terms of human and non-human resources to effectively provide the required disability services.

These services require an institutional arrangement that brings specialists from different areas to work together to develop and implement appropriate interventions. Effective provision of disability services can only be achieved when categorisation of people with disability is made based on the severity of their disabilities. With the current approach, the SNGs Unit runs the risk of being overstretched or getting bogged down in the delivery of rehabilitation or medical services which are not sufficiently linked to reintegration objectives.

### **Activity Result 4: Capacity building**

The DEX implementation modality employed by UNDP led to the establishment of a parallel structure with no interface with the SSDDRC. Although DDR activities were implemented, very little capacity building support was provided to national institutions at central and state levels during the first two years of the programme period. However,

capacity building support to the SSDDRC improved in the following years as confirmed by most respondents within the SSDDRC at national and state levels.

UNDP capacity building support to the SSDDRC included:

1. Redesigning the post-referendum DDR programme (including policy, strategy and programme for the new DDRP).
2. Adoption of a collocation strategy to capacity building which entails the provision of the services of embedded international and national experts to work with the SSDDRC staff.
3. Training, coaching/on-the-job mentoring, and study tours.
4. Preparation of financial and management manuals.
5. Preparation of annual work plans by the SSDDRC with the technical support from UNDP.
6. Enhancing financial management capacities of the SSDDRC by transferring funds based on Letter of Agreement signed with UNDP.
7. Capacity building support provided, specifically in relation to the new DDR programme (2013-2020).

Programme support contributed to improved planning, reintegration, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, information technology, logistics, human resource management, and asset management capacities of the SSDDRC. For example, UNDP support enabled the SNGs Unit of the SSDDRC to establish institutional linkages with the rehabilitation and health facilities to assist XCs with disability to get access to their services.

By assisting the preparation of South Sudan's DDR policy and strategic plan and conceptualising the DDR council, UNDP contributed to laying a good foundation for the post-independence South Sudan DDR programme. The establishment of the DDR council has filled an important gap of the SSDDRC and is actively directing the new DDR programme. UNDP capacity building efforts as of early 2011 were widely believed to have positively impacted on UNDP and SSDDRC relations. The collocation strategy has effectively contributed to improved coordination, communication, and work planning. In addition to enhancing national ownership, it also facilitated the transfer of skills in relation to planning and management of reintegration services. Moreover, it allowed UNDP international experts to coach SSDDRC staff at national and state levels.

However, the potential of UNDP capacity building efforts to generate significant results was constrained by the:

- (i) absence of a comprehensive and well-designed capacity building strategy for the Commission that can serve as a guide to fill capacity gaps identified through a systematic needs assessment study;
- (ii) inadequate absorptive capacity of some of the SSDDRC staff;
- (iii) lack of well-planned and sustained measures to build capacity;
- (iv) high staff turnover as qualified and skilled people left the SSDDRC for better salaries in the non-public sector; and
- (v) poor monitoring of progress on capacity building due to the absence of benchmarks, milestones and targets.

The result of future capacity building interventions will greatly depend on the availability of motivated, trainable staff within the SSDDRC and the capacity to retain them. The low pay scale within the civil service was the main cause of high staff turnover. This must be partly addressed through the institutionalisation of attractive employment terms and conditions particularly for the core staff of the SSDDRC such as an improved salary scale, opportunities of further education, etc.

#### Activity Result 5: Management support

UNDP supported the strengthening of the SSDDRC through the provision of assets of various uses including office equipment and furniture, vehicles, office buildings, and VSATs. This support has enabled the SSDDRC to perform its functions and provide DDR services to XCs and SNGs. The VSATs installed in all state offices, for example, has enabled improved communication between the SSDDRC HQ and state offices through the Internet.

## 4. Programme Resource, partnership and Management

### 4.1. Resources

The DDR programme in South Sudan received a total contribution of US\$ 50,678,958 from donors during 2009-2011 for the Individual Reintegration Component of which 2.3 million was withdrawn in 2012. The donors include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund-South Sudan (MDTF-SS), and the governments of UK, Canada, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Japan.

**Table 3: Programme Resource by Donor**

Year	Amount in US \$								
	MDTF	UK	Canada	Norway	Germany	Sweden	Italy	Japan	Total
2009	0	1,264,801	0	767,099	0	0	465,731	-6,063	2,491,569
2010	6,807,755	139,763	37,330	4,094,535	780,730	343,474	305,010	0	12,508,597
2011	16,339,409	92,469	765,170	0	1,628,909	0	0	0	18,825,955
2012	13,306,484	0	0	3,705	0	0	0	0	13,310,190
Expenditure (2009-2012)	36,453,648	1,497,033	802,500	4,865,339	2,409,639	343,474	770,741	-6,063	47,136,310
Allocation (2009-2012)	36,491,144	1,497,033	802,500	4,865,525	2,409,639	343,474	770,741	-6,063	47,173,994
Balance	37,496	0	0	186	0	0	0	0	37,683

UNDP faced resource constraints towards the end of the programme when it lost US\$ 2.3 million of uncommitted funds due to a misunderstanding with donors regarding project closure. This has negatively impacted on UNDP as it was forced to reallocate resources from other projects to provide reintegration services to XCs and SNGs. The GoSS also did not meet its commitment to contribute resources to the DDR programme as agreed in the project document. Austerity measures declared in 2012 further affected the programme as it constrained the government's ability to perform its normal functions.



## 4.2. Partnerships

### (i) Partnership with the Government/SSDDRC

UNDP's partnership with the Government of South Sudan, particularly with the SSDDRC was initially difficult mainly due to lack of proper consultation, transparency, flexibility and effective communication on the part of UNDP. This was a result of UNDP's centralised management approach, which led to the establishment of a parallel structure with no linkages with the SSDDRC. The GoSS and SSDDRC viewed the programme as externally driven initiative that was not aligned to the needs and priorities of South Sudan. As a result, the GoSS/SSDDRC did not assume national ownership and leadership of the programme, which caused significant challenges to the programme in South Sudan.

UNDP managed to improve its relations with the SSDDRC during the second half of the programme period (i.e. as of early 2011) through improved transparency and consultation. The weekly meetings conducted with the SSDDRC and IPs facilitated coordination and assessment of progress. Its effect was even more visible on the Commission's improved sense of ownership.

### (ii) Partnership with Donors

Programme implementation required working with different donors supporting the programme. Satisfying these donors who have their own priorities, policies and requirements was quite a challenge for UNDP. Although there was good potential for positive partnership due to UNDP's technical competencies in the area of DDR and donors interest to support the programme, it was not well tapped.

One of the causes, which strained UNDP relations with donors, was the absence of regular donor meetings to jointly plan and assess progress. Until early 2011, only one Oversight Committee meeting of the MDTF-SS was held in Khartoum. Apart from this, there were complaints from donors about a lack of harmonised reports from UNDP. However, donors should also take their share of responsibility for their complacency and lack of initiative to put pressure on UNDP particularly at the initial stage. The donors should have demanded that UNDP conduct regular joint meetings to review progress made and address challenges arising during implementation. It would not be right to hold UNDP responsible for the low level of achievement in relation to the number of demobilized soldiers (12,525 instead of 34,000). As stated earlier, UNDP's role in this programme was limited to reintegration of those disarmed and demobilized by the SPLA and UNMISS, respectively. This however does not absolve UNDP from being fully responsible for the reintegration component of the DDR programme.

In brief, donor relations were constrained due to: (i) lack of coordination; (ii) absence of regular meetings and joint planning, follow up and monitoring; (iii) lack of harmonised reports; (iv) insufficient funding; and (v) inadequate transparency and accountability.

### **(iii) Partnership with UNMISS**

Relations with UNMISS were difficult at the initial stage mainly due to issues related to reporting channels and organizational status. This improved gradually over time and reached its highest level during the last two years of programme period. During the field visit, the Team had the opportunity to witness good cooperation between UNDP and UNMISS at national and state levels.

### **(iv) Partnership with IPs**

UNDP partnership with IPs was generally assessed as good, although there were some challenges in relation to delivery of reintegration services and reporting. Some IPs shared more information than others. To alleviate this problem, UNDP gave orientation to IPs contracted under the Small Grant Scheme on report writing, both technical and financial.

## **4.3. Programme Management**

The CPA called for a nationally owned DDR programme, through the formation of the National DDR Coordinating body with two DDR commissions to guide the DDR process in the north and south. The governance structure described in the project document was not strictly implemented. UNDP's centralised management structure did not allow autonomy to the N/SSDDRC. All decisions on the DDR programme were being taken centrally in Khartoum, creating a feeling on the part of SSDDRC that programme management was not done in line with the DDR strategy. As strategic decisions regarding the programme were all made in the North, the SSDDRC established technical committees for demobilization and reintegration to deal with operational issues, which contributed to improved programme implementation.

The National DDR Coordination Council and Oversight Committee, which was established in accordance with the project document, was not effective. A glaring example of this is the lack of regular meetings of the Oversight Committee which was responsible for overseeing the programme. This has been a major source of frustration for donors. Moreover, effectiveness of programme management was affected by the lack of proper consultations, adequate coordination, regular meetings, and transparency.

Programme management began to improve in early 2011 when decision-making power was transferred from the management in Khartoum to Juba (South Sudan). This was further consolidated after independence with the SSDDRC assuming a greater leadership and coordination role. UNDP managed the programme in close collaboration with the SSDDRC. At the national level, the Oversight Committee consisting of SSDDRC, donors, UNDP, UNMISS and other UN agencies was overseeing programme implementation. It conducted its regular monthly meeting and was giving guidance on programme implementation. This had important implications on national ownership and leadership, which resulted from improved coordination and working relations between UNDP and the SSDDRC.

Accordingly, major responsibilities for directing programme implementation were in the hands of the SSDDRC. Annual work plans were jointly developed by UNDP and the Commission and were approved by the Commission. Selection of international organizations as IPs was done by UNDP in collaboration with the SSDDRC employing a competitive bidding process. Once selected, contracts with IPs were jointly signed by the SSDDRC and UNDP. By doing these activities jointly, UNDP and the SCDDRC managed to improve programme management and coordination. Moreover, with the technical support of UNDP, senior SSDDRC management has successfully presented the strategic framework for the new DDR programme and secured its approval in the council of ministers. In brief, although it was initially difficult, UNDP and SSDDRC have improved their relations and finally managed to jointly prepare work plans, coordinate reintegration activities and monitoring progress.

#### 4.4. Implementation strategy

To guide programme implementation UNDP had initially set up a relatively large structure that stretched from the head office in Khartoum to state levels. This decision was taken with the expectation of receiving 34,000 XCs and SNGs for reintegration services. However, this did not materialize as planned, affecting UNDP's overall performance. Furthermore, the information obtained regarding the limited geographical area where reintegration of demobilized soldiers was planned to take place turned out not to be true. As a result, UNDP had to expand its management structure to all ten states of South Sudan following the movement of demobilized soldiers. This has resulted in a wide variation in caseloads across the states with a few of them (e.g. in some counties of Western Equatoria) having no case to attend to. But since UNDP had already put a DDR team (1 international and 2 nationals) on the ground, it has increased the overhead cost of the programme. Moreover, as demobilization was stopped in April 2011, programme overhead costs remained high until UNDP significantly reduced its staffing level.

The programme was implemented by UNDP in collaboration with the SSDDRC using the DEX modality by employing UNDP procurement and financial procedures and guidelines. Requests for proposal (RFPs) for reintegration packages were advertised in August 2009, and bids received were reviewed jointly by UNDP and N/SSDDRC. Accordingly, international organizations such as IOM, FAO, and GIZ were contracted by UNDP jointly with the SSDDRC as IPs to provide reintegration support to XCs. The first contractual agreement was signed with FAO in December 2009 followed by similar agreements with IOM and GIZ in early 2010.

IPs have generally done their level best within the difficult context of South Sudan namely low economic opportunities, lack of appropriate training facilities, poor roads, vast implementation areas away from the training facilities (some of them are 100 kms apart), long distance between the training centre and beneficiaries settlement areas making follow ups difficult, insecurity in some parts of the country, low institutional capacities of line ministries and logistical problems due to rainy season, etc. The evaluation showed that the decision made to involve these big international organizations did not help in creating the local capacity necessary for programme sustainability.

Local NGOs were contracted as IPs to deliver reintegration services towards the end of the programme period. This created an opportunity for them to demonstrate their capacities in the provision of training, supply of tool kits and delivery of follow-up services. The evaluation showed that the local NGOs have played a crucial role in making the Small Grant Scheme a success. They were flexible in their approaches and have aligned themselves better to the programme. With limited resource and time, they managed to complete the reintegration package as planned mainly because they knew their local environment better and exhibited a greater sense of responsibility to help their compatriots.

The delay observed in initiating the Small Grant Scheme has put a lot of pressure on the local IPs and appeared to have an effect on the reintegration support provided to beneficiaries. It also prevented the programme from using the services of some of the well-established NGOs (e.g. Norwegian People's Aid), which have declined to participate in the Small Grant Scheme mainly due to the short duration of the programme implementation period (3 months). Their participation would have contributed to the programme's cost-effectiveness and would have enhanced the capacities of participating IPs.

Some of the NGOs or private training institutions (e.g. Don Bosco) that were sub-contracted by the international organizations should have been contracted directly by UNDP to implement training programmes. This would have contributed to enhanced cost-effectiveness and capacity building of national institutions. For example, FAO, after being contracted by UNDP invited proposals from other organizations and sub-contracted (APARD, CEFA, and BRAC) to undertake reintegration activities. It is important to note that BRAC was one of the IPs, which was directly contracted by UNDP to provide reintegration services in Western Equatoria State. UNDP contracted IOM as an IP, which subcontracted to the South Sudan Red Cross to provide reintegration training, which in turn sub-subcontracted the work to trainers within the Ministry of Agriculture in Western Bahr el Ghazal. This practice has increased programme overheads, which resulted in the reduction of benefits that went directly to ultimate beneficiaries. This could have been avoided by putting a ceiling to overheads of IPs (a certain percentage of the total budget), which both the IPs and subcontracted agencies should have shared.

One of the crucial gaps observed in programme implementation was the low level of participation of line ministries and host communities. Relations of the SSDDRC with line ministries both at national and state levels were inadequate and not institutionalised.<sup>3</sup> Lack of formal institutional mechanisms to facilitate coordination with line ministries was assessed as one of the major programme weaknesses. Host communities were either left out entirely or involved only on an ad-hoc basis. Consequently, both line ministries and host communities were unable to play their expected roles in reintegration activities.

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<sup>3</sup> This was a key lesson learned. International IPs were able to perform their tasks but no provision was made to mentor/coach national IPs so that they could take over the whole process.

## 5. Key Findings

### 5.1. Programme design

The DDR programme was incredibly important for South Sudan though its design was not well aligned to the local context. The difference between North and South Sudan was not well reflected in the design. Programme designers did not fully capture all the factors (economic opportunities, infrastructure, social services, culture, etc.) that bring about the wide gap between the north and south. Those who knew better about the local environment were not properly consulted. The views and concerns of the SSDDRC in relation to programme design were not seriously considered. Consequently, the GoSS and SSRDC have decided to reduce their level of engagement in programme management. This unfortunate situation impacted the CPA DDR programme right from the very beginning and continued to affect it to the end. The flaws in programme design were the major causes of many of the problems faced during implementation.

### 5.2. Relevance

With the signing of the CPA, it was not necessary for the GoSS to keep a large army. The country needed huge rehabilitation and reconstruction work in every sector of the economy and this was found to be incompatible with maintaining a big army. Demobilization of active-duty soldiers to release funds from war efforts to developmental activities was not a choice but rather a necessity for the country. The CPA DDR programme was thus widely hailed as a timely response to this call and was expected to help the government undertake effective security sector reform, which would eventually lead to the right size of the army that the economy would be able to maintain. CPA DDR was also relevant to the soldiers who lost their livelihood and skills due to war. Thus, DDR was and is still highly relevant to the country.

However, the DDR did not work as planned during the CPA period mainly due to lack of political will on the part of Sudan and Southern Sudan to demobilize active duty soldiers. This was partly because the CPA DDR programme was ill-timed as it was initiated at a time when there was serious political mistrust between Sudan and Southern Sudan due to unsettled issues related to the independence referendum, Abyei, border demarcation, wealth sharing, etc. In addition, the low absorptive capacity of the national economy was not conducive for DDR. Consequently, DDR failed as a confidence building measure due to the overall unfavourable political climate and absence of enabling economic factors.

### 5.3. Efficiency

Overall, the programme has not been cost-effective. It was rather a costly programme with high overhead partly caused by the lower number of demobilized soldiers (i.e. 37% of the targeted 34,000). An important indicator of the programme's low efficiency level is cost per XC, which was determined to be US\$ 3,770.

UNDP has deployed excess manpower at the initial stage with the expectation of receiving a bigger caseload (34,000 XCs) and this has increased programme overhead. However once

the demobilization process was stopped, UNDP management took the right decision to cut overheads by reducing staff from 133 to 78 in 2011 and to 36 in June 2012 and finally to 2 in December 2012.

Another important factor which affected programme efficiency was the lack of consistency among the IPs in breaking the budget into administration overheads and resources that went directly to XCs. The amount of direct support provided by the big international organizations contracted as IPs to beneficiaries was different. When IPs were requested to standardise, they came up with figures ranging from US\$ 870 to \$900. The amount of resources allocated for tool kits also differed among the IPs. It ranged from as high as 50% for all the IPs which participated in the Small Grant Scheme to as low as 27% for IOM and 21% for GIZ and FAO. This shows that overhead and operational costs of IPs were much higher than the norm. These findings indicate that the programme was not cost-effective.

Having learned from its previous contracting practices, UNDP has improved the terms and conditions for IPs engaged in the Small Grant Scheme. For example, in the new contract IPs were required to spend 50% of the budget on tool kits, which is more than double what the international organizations used to allocate for the same purpose. In addition, it has also abandoned the previous practice of using expected number of XCs as a basis for resource allocation to IPs and replaced it with the actual number of XCs registered. This saved resources for the programme and improved efficiency. It also motivated IPs to make extra efforts to trace as many XCs as they can in order to secure more resources, though they cannot go beyond the ceiling of US\$ 350,000.

**Table 4: Resources Per XC**

IPs	Total Resource	No. of XCs	Resource/XC	Total value of Tool kits	Tool kit/total Resource (%)
IOM	8,394,979	5,768	1,455	2,307,200	27%
GIZ	6,492,981	3,397	1,911	1,358,800	21%
FAO	2,885,892	1,873	1,541	616,314	21%
Small Grant Scheme IPs	1,471,857	938	1,569	735,928	50%
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,245,709</b>	<b>11,976</b>	<b>1,607</b>	<b>5,018,242</b>	<b>26%</b>

The practice of contracting and subcontracting of IPs has inflated overhead costs for the programme and reduced the level of reintegration support directed to the ultimate beneficiaries. UNDP has followed standard procedures (HACT) to transfer funds to IPs in accordance with the Letter of Agreement signed with each one of them. Despite the financial and reporting training provided to IPs, there were still delays observed in transferring funds to IPs. This was mainly because some of the requests made by IPs did not meet the financial requirements of UNDP (i.e. incomplete documents) and had to be referred back to them for the necessary corrections and amendments to be made.

## 5.4. Effectiveness

The evaluation showed that the programme did not effectively capture active duty soldiers as planned mainly due to serious political mistrust between Sudan and Southern Sudan. This was mainly due to the uncertain political situation with the possibility of a return to war as witnessed by the occasional, though brief, armed clashes along the borders (e.g. Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal). As a result, the programme ended up mainly supporting WAAF, XCs with disability, women XCs and elderly who were already self-reintegrated into their communities. Moreover, the large number of WAAF and proxies in the programme tended to defeat this all important objective, and that the inclusion of proxies did not amount to any reduction in the armed forces as many were proxies to the WAAF. The needs of these groups (WAAF and proxies), in the view of the Team, would have been better addressed through alternative schemes to allow the DDR project to effectively focus on one target group, "Disarmed and Demobilized Soldiers."

An efficient and sustainable DDR programme must involve effective collection, safe storage and destruction of weapons used by the demobilized combatants, to ensure the "Disarmament" component of the programme. The CPA DDR did not involve actual collection of firearms to that effect. Hence it is unlikely to achieve the reduction of armed violence since communities remain awash with weapons. In this regard, there was a serious lack of attention by the programme and the UN Mission to the all important aspects of the "Disarmament" component of DDR.

Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the key informants and focus group participants felt that service delivery was slow although they stated that the reintegration support provided was useful. Skill trainings provided to XCs helped them acquire new skills which in turn enabled them to get employment or become self-employed. Though small, the tool kits distributed have also partly addressed the start-up requirements of the beneficiaries.

## 5.5. Impact

Reintegration of XCs and SNGs must be viewed as a process rather than as an event. Needless to say, sustainable social and economic reintegration cannot be achieved within a short period of time through limited interventions. Nevertheless, all those who have got reintegration support have benefited from the programme in terms of new skills acquired and tool kits provided. The time elapsed since the reintegration support was provided to XCs was too short to allow generation of significant programme impact. However, there were early indications of programme impacts, which can be discussed as follows:

### **(i) Economic impact**

Even though the impact may not have been felt at national and state levels, it was significant at the individual and household levels. Beneficiaries have acquired new knowledge and skills, which helped them get jobs or start their own businesses. A number

of DDR beneficiaries have found employment with state and local government institutions as drivers and unskilled labourers, whereas others were self-employed utilizing their skills and tool kits to earn new income<sup>4</sup>.

New micro-enterprises were created or maintained allowing beneficiaries to meet household needs including sending their children to school amidst the difficult economic environment. Some beneficiaries practising agriculture have reported an increase in their production as a result of the adoption of ox ploughs to enhance farming. However, the training was not organized in a way that would enable beneficiaries to become multi-skilled and earn a living from multiple livelihoods.

### **(ii) Social impact**

Most of the beneficiaries were already living within their communities and hence had no difficulty when faced with living with the rest of the community<sup>5</sup>. The programme has increased awareness of the beneficiaries about hygiene and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc. which they claim to have applied in their day-to-day activities. They have also reported that they transferred life skills to neighbours, friends and other community members. Another major impact of the programme is that it has enabled women to acquire new skills to either create their own small business or get jobs in private and public sectors.

However, the social reintegration of XCs is constrained by the lack of basic infrastructure at the local (*Payam* and *Boma*) levels. One of the major weaknesses of the programme was the absence of a strategy to use the country's social capital to reintegrate the XCs. The lack of emphasis on community-based projects was another weakness of programme design of the CPA DDR.

## **5.6. Sustainability**

A sustainable DDR programme requires total buy-in, ownership, leadership and political support from national authorities. The CPA DDR was crafted for one country, but did not take into account the two systems approach of the CPA, and as such did not win much support from the GoSS. This resulted in a low level of involvement by the government in programme management and implementation until independence. Vital line ministries did not participate in the planning and implementation of reintegration activities as desired, and this is likely to affect programme sustainability. It is important to bear in mind that concerned line ministries will continue to provide socio-economic services needed by XCs and their communities long after SSDDRC and UNDP technical support phases out.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the impact assessment conducted by Bonn International Centre for Conversion (B.I.C.C.), 71% of those who attended vocational skills training said that the training enabled them to generate income.

<sup>5</sup> The B.I.C.C. study showed that: "95 % of the interviewees believe that they are socially integrated into their communities. Many interviewees emphasise that the strength of community ties enabled them to survive in a situation where government or NGO support is not satisfactory. Majority of respondents feels no discrimination in accessing services in the community. Regarding their access to social services, the impact assessment study showed that: "a majority (70 %) of respondents who have children said that their children were attending school, 87% had access to health services (note that the study focused on urban areas), and 58 % did not have sufficient access to enough clean water."



It is too early to ascertain the sustainability of the benefits provided to beneficiaries. However, the low capacities of national institutions, limited economic and livelihood opportunities, and low entrepreneurial skills of XCs is likely to affect programme sustainability. There were strong indications that beneficiaries have continued to use the tool kits provided as part of the reintegration package, although some of the poor quality tools were already discarded. Sustainability of businesses owned by beneficiaries was greatly influenced by the adequacy of tool kits provided. Those who opted for kiosks, for example, said that with the low level of tool kit provided by the project, they could not expand the business as whatever small amount of income they were able to generate had to partly go to meet immediate household needs, leaving very little to develop the business. Follow up services provided by IPs were not geared towards the provision of technical and advisory services and hence had little contribution towards sustainability of livelihood activities supported by the programme.

### **5.7. Connectedness of DDR to the wider recovery strategy**

The evaluation showed that the DDR programme was not well integrated to the wider recovery strategy including community security, social cohesion, reconstruction and respect for human rights and rule of law in South Sudan. This was mainly a result of inappropriate project design which, among other things, resulted in the centralisation of decision making power in Khartoum. It did not provide room for UNDP South Sudan to integrate the programme with other security and recovery-related activities. Innovations that were later adopted to improve synergies and coordination of project activities (e.g. community-based approach) did not make much of a difference. The limited scope of the programme and its closer link with UNMISS and IPs also weakened coordination with other security and recovery-related activities.

### **5.8. Monitoring and evaluation**

The effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation activities was affected by lack of reliable baseline data. The absence of a baseline data compromised monitoring and evaluation activities as those responsible for these tasks have no benchmarks against which progress towards results can be assessed. There was also little link between M&E, management information system and programme reporting, constraining the programme's potential to generate crucial information for follow up and decision-making.

Nevertheless, reporting skills of UNDP staff at national and state levels have benefited the programme especially in relation to the preparation of weekly reports. In addition, the weekly training sessions conducted by the Management Information System Team at SSDDRC Commission assisted in enhancing skills of the commission's staff. The weekly meetings with IPs enabled UNDP to assess progress, provide timely guidance on implementation challenges and allow for the sharing of experiences both positive and negative, resulting in improved programme performance.

### **5.9. Programme challenges**

- Lack of government ownership and leadership particularly at the initial stage. SPLA did not commit itself to the DDR programme and consequently it demobilized those who

were not needed in the army such as the elderly, XCs with disability, women, and children. Most XCs were not active-duty soldiers. These problems resulted in a low number of demobilized soldiers affecting programme performance and efficiency.

- Inadequate human and institutional capacities at national and local levels have affected programme planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting. Fuel shortages, for example, were cited as one of the main programme challenges in the states. This was further compounded by high staff turnover within the SSDDRC (e.g. DDR state offices suffer from shortages of staff).
- The programme design was not well aligned to the local conditions of South Sudan (e.g. low economic opportunities, poor roads, lack of training facilities, etc.) and was not developed through a consultative and inclusive process. The period for actual delivery of the reintegration programme was not planned based on local realities (e.g. impact of rainy season on programme activities).
- Absence of good quality baseline data and standardised templates for monitoring and evaluation negatively affected M&E activities including reporting and assessment of progress and achievements.
- Ex-combatants were misinformed by the army about what the DDR programme offers. For example, they were informed that the SSDDRC supported by UN will take care of them and will have a similar standard of living with those remaining in the army. As a result, XCs came to the DDR programme with high and unrealistic expectations, which were hard to fulfil.
- Delays experienced between demobilization and reintegration at the initial stage affected programme results as it led to many missing XCs who were traced through considerable PI efforts. In addition, UNDP had to hire staff to cover wide areas where XCs were expected to settle and this has increased delivery cost significantly.
- The low economic level of the country has constrained the employment or self-employment opportunities of XCs. Besides, the long years of civil war has weakened the absorptive capacity of the communities, which has negatively impacted the social and economic reintegration of XCs.
- South Sudan has poor infrastructure, this created significant logistical challenges to IPs. Delays were common in the procurement and delivery of goods which had an impact on programme implementation.
- UNDP's procurement process at times caused considerable delays in the provision of goods needed for programme implementation mainly in relation to management support (e.g. procurement of PI equipment took two years; procurement of vehicles took a very long time) and staff recruitment (e.g. recruitment of the Reintegration Advisor never materialised). However according to the SSDDRC, there was marked improvement in the procurement process of UNDP towards the last half of the project.
- Insecurity in some parts of the country also affected programme implementation.
- Counselling services during demobilization were not thorough and were mainly confined to profiling of the XCs. The whole process was rushed and caseworkers did not have enough time to provide professional and personalised counselling services. This has affected the work of IPs during the reintegration period.
- Training programmes put together to equip XCs with skills were not standardised and harmonised. Managing the expectations of XCs proved to be difficult particularly in relation to the value and content of packages. This was further complicated by the

difference in packages among IPs including cash payments (stipend) and quality and value of tool kits.

- The austerity measures declared in 2012 had its own effect on the performance and service delivery of the SSDDRC as well as on the reintegration process of XCs. The Team observed that state SSDDRC staffs have mobility problems due to fuel shortages.

## 6. Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned

### 6.1. Conclusions

The evaluation showed that social and economic reintegration of XCs and SNGs in South Sudan was quite demanding. This was a result of low economic opportunities, inadequate capacities of national institutions at the central and state levels, poor roads, a shortage of training facilities, high illiteracy levels among XCs, etc. Besides which, a lack of proper consultation and transparency on the part of UNDP, especially at the initial stage, and the subsequent decline in GoSS/SSDDRC support to DDR affected reintegration of XCs and SNGs.

UNDP reintegration services were constrained by the decision made to stop the demobilization process after 12,525 XCs and SNGs were demobilized by UNMISS. This increased programme overhead as the management structure that was put in place by UNDP was designed based on the expected workload of 34,000 XCs and SNGs. The gap between demobilization and reintegration, especially at the initial stage, created a large number of missing cases which in addition to slowing down programme implementation, consumed significant resources in tracing them.

Despite the above challenges, the programme benefited 12,525 XCs and SNGs by providing them reintegration packages comprising skills training, start-up kits and follow-ups. This support allowed them to get jobs or start their own business, which enabled them to earn new income. As a result, they were able to meet immediate household needs including school fees for children. However, not everyone who was trained got a job or started his/her own business and some even went back to the army or remained at large, representing a security threat.

From the discussions with key informants and beneficiaries, the most important prerequisite for successful reintegration of XCs was to have the right mindset as well as the initiative to start new life outside the army. The incorrect information given by the army resulted in XCs having unrealistic expectations from the DDR programme and that has partly weakened their resolve to lead an independent life outside the army. The perception of XCs as liberators and thus deserving compensation from the country affected the preparation of XCs to face demobilization. This was reflected by the disappointment of XCs with the reinsertion package which they felt was far too little compared to their services and the promises made by their commanders during and after the war. The effect of this was felt throughout the programme period. To address the misconceptions about DDR and manage expectations of XCs, the programme carried out a range of PI activities targeting different sections of the society.

The participation of line ministries in implementing CPA DDR was either low or not institutionalised. This is likely to affect the sustenance of project benefits which require continuous services from line ministries at national and state levels. For example, inadequate extension services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will affect sustainability of agricultural activities supported by the programme. Thus, the need for mainstreaming reintegration services within line ministries should be a priority in the upcoming DDR programme. To this end, significant technical and financial support must be given to government institutions to prepare them for the planned big caseload (150,000 XCs) in the new DDR programme.

Overall, social reintegration has not been a problem as the population accepted XCs as liberators. It is also important to remember that the majority of the beneficiaries have already lived with their communities for years until they were called for DDR and hence their social reintegration was not particularly problematic. There were however some challenges mainly related to a lack of basic social services, poor roads, limited access to land especially in urban areas (e.g. Juba), etc. which constrained successful social reintegration of XCs and SNGs.

The management structure established for the programme was not aligned to the context of South Sudan. The views and concerns of the GoSS/SSDDRC were not incorporated into the project document. As a result, the programme did not enjoy strong support from the SSDDRC, which in turn affected programme implementation. However, Government ownership and leadership improved as of the beginning of 2011. UNDP supported government efforts by embedding international and national experts in the SSDDRC to provide reintegration services and coach SSDDRC staff at national and state levels.

Overall, UNDP support contributed to improved capacities of the SSDDRC at head office and state levels. However, much remains to be desired in capacity building support as there were still huge capacity gaps especially at state level, where there is a critical staff shortage (state offices were run by just 3 or 4 staff). This was partly due to high staff turnover caused by low salaries. A retention policy that makes provision for an improved salary scale, which is different from that of the civil service (e.g. topping up salary of core staff) is thus highly crucial. The capacity building efforts of the SSDDRC were also affected by the changes observed in UNDP staff due to the nature of their contracts. This did not allow the SSDDRC to benefit from the services of UNDP experts for an extended period of time.

## 6.2. Recommendations

To facilitate implementation, the recommendations are directed at the main actors of DDR namely GoSS/SSDDRC and UNDP. Agency specific recommendations are presented as follows.

### **A. To GoSS/SSDDRC**

- Ensure strong national ownership and leadership including active participation of line ministries and other national institutions in planning, implementation and M&E

activities. Government must lead and direct the new DDR programme by developing and reviewing policies and strategies to guide the efforts of all stakeholders. Allocate adequate resources for programme implementation including those required for labour intensive projects to be initiated as part of job creation for XCs.

- Develop clear criteria to decide who is eligible to go through the DDR process. Verify whether those sent by the SPLA fulfil these criteria.
- Send a clear and accurate message about what DDR can do for XCs by initially focusing on the army and later expanding its outreach to other stakeholders. To this end, update the PI strategy to make it more responsive to the context of South Sudan.
- Create new, and renovate existing, training facilities in areas where XCs are expected to settle.
- Put job creation at the centre of the new DDR programme by making resources from government and donors available for that specific purpose. Based on the cooperative law of the country, organize XCs into different cooperatives. Make sure that these cooperatives do not become chronically dependent on government subsidies. The concessional contracts given at the initial stage should allow them to be competitive. Give tax incentives to private sector enterprises to encourage them to hire XCs. Besides those actions, consider the allocation of land to XCs for income generating activities. Also support community projects as part of creating jobs for XCs and receiving host communities.
- Organize a separate scheme to support WAAF, CAAF and XCs with major disability outside the DDR.

#### **B. To SSDDRC/UNDP**

- As the approach adopted to implement the new DDR programme is entirely different, pilot it effectively, learn from positive and negative experiences and developments, and apply lessons learned to improve programme performance.
- Create, maintain and develop a high quality database on all programme indicators to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of results. Conduct a baseline survey to establish benchmarks, milestones and targets. Allocate enough resources to do mapping of XCs to know who is doing what and where.
- Develop a public information strategy to give accurate information to XCs and the general public. Conduct inclusive and organized sensitisation and PI programmes targeting different sections of the society namely XCs, host communities, traditional leaders, CBOs, IPs, government officials at national and local levels, etc.
- Conduct a comprehensive and systematic capacity needs assessment based on the programme's planned results and activities to determine the magnitude and nature of the existing capacity gap then plan and implement appropriate capacity building strategies to bridge that gap.
- Work closely with line ministries, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector to facilitate the provision of technical and advisory support to XCs by establishing good linkages especially in agriculture, livestock and provision of micro-finance services.
- Involve local communities in programme planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Identify and train community focal persons (e.g. chiefs) for DDR to link XCs with the programme and government offices. Involve community leaders in the demobilization and reintegration process as well as in peace and reconciliation efforts.

- Provide standardised and harmonised integrated rural development training to ensure that they are delivered to make XCs multi-skilled and help them diversify their livelihoods.

### **C. To UNDP**

- Provide technical and financial support to strengthen the human, institutional and organizational capacities of relevant national institutions which participate in DDR activities.
- Undertake selection of IPs based on proven training capacity. Unless absolutely necessary, discourage IPs which sub-contract their work to others as this would increase overheads and reduce benefits that directly goes to XCs. Try to limit unnecessary overheads so that XCs get the same reintegration benefits.
- Utilize UNDP's competitive advantage by highlighting its wide representation in the country and demonstrate how this can be effectively used to deliver services. Focus on areas where UNDP has proven strength and competitive advantage.
- Improve relations with donors through open and effective communication as well as more regular reporting and meetings. Give more space to donors to give timely feedback.
- Show flexibility in working with all stakeholders by conducting regular meetings and submitting reports as per the requirement of donors.

### **6.3. Lessons learned**

The lessons learned from the evaluation of the CPA DDR can be summarised as follows.

- National ownership and leadership is of paramount importance for the successful implementation of DDR programme.
- Giving a unified and accurate message regarding DDR is critical for its success. The purpose of the message should be to prepare XCs for the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in their civilian life.
- Partnership needs to be nurtured through good communication and flexibility appreciating that every organization has its own unique policies, norms, values and culture.
- Strong organizational and human capacities at national and state levels are key to effective and efficient programme implementation.
- A strong monitoring and evaluation system is crucial for the success of DDR programme. The collection of accurate data is an essential prerequisite for effective planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. An absence of a high quality livelihood database hampers effective programme reporting, monitoring and evaluation. The CPA DDR programme suffered from inaccuracies and inconsistencies of data starting from disarmament to reintegration.
- Alignment of DDR programme to local conditions is a prerequisite for successful programme implementation. Having an overambitious and unrealistic programme affects implementation in several ways. It is important to start small and expand

gradually depending on the actual caseload. This will help in ensuring cost-effectiveness and assist with meeting donors' expectations.

- In view of the difficult situation (low economic development, poor roads, low educational background, etc.) of South Sudan, the timeframe given for the CPA DDR training programmes appears to be too short. Effective and sustainable reintegration of XCs into civil life requires more time and greater support.
- Colocation of UNDP advisors and staff was key for effective communication, faster coordination and skill transfer. Institution building and skills transfer is a gradual process and need to be planned properly with agreed milestones to be achieved. This however needs to be supported with a competitive salary scale. As part of the civil service, the salary scale within the SSDDRC is low and this has resulted in high rate of staff turnover. In order to retain its best staff, the SSDDRC need to groom and retain its core staff by introducing salary top ups.
- The community-based approach to reintegration is an effective way of securing community involvement in reintegrating XCs. It is important to note that the social capital of communities have proven social, psychological, financial and moral rehabilitation mechanisms that they can put to effective use in reintegrating XCs.
- Culture and tradition have considerable influence on the successful reintegration of the beneficiaries. The evaluation showed that business activities of beneficiaries were negatively affected by the communal way of life which resulted in: (i) sharing income generated by the beneficiaries with members of an extended family; (ii) not paying for services rendered by mechanics, welders, barefoot veterinarians, etc; and (iii) seeds distributed for agriculture being consumed by relatively larger families.
- To implement an effective DDR programme communities need to be at peace with themselves. The introduction of DDR in the absence of peace and security results in a lack of political will by governments to engage in authentic demobilization of their armed forces, the appearance of non-combatants in the programme dominating the clientele, road safety problems in insecure environments with minimal infrastructure and often the return of ex-combatants to barracks.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

#### Final Evaluation "Multi Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme (Individual Reintegration Component)" *under the CPAP 2009-2012*

#### Background

Final Evaluation "Multi Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme (Individual Reintegration Component)" *under the CPAP 2009-2012*

The Programme Context:

This term of Reference is for Final Evaluation "Multi Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme (Individual Reintegration Component)" *under the Common Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2012*.

Sudan has experienced a protracted period of fighting classified by many as the longest war in Africa. The conflict officially ended in January 2005 and in March of the same year, peace was brokered by international community and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by both The Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). As part of an overall CPA implementation process, both sides committed to a transparent and effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes which will support the transition of ex-combatants (XCs) and associated members from military to productive civilian life aimed at ensuring a secure, stable and peaceful Sudan. The National DDR Coordination Council was established by presidential decree to oversee the DDR process at the highest policy level followed by the formation of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions to lead design and implementation of DDR process.

In accordance with the CPA and Security Council Resolution SC 1590 of March 24, 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was mandated to provide support and assistance to the Government of National Unity (GONU) and Government of South Sudan (GOSS) in planning, developing and implementing the national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. In this context, the Integrated UN DDR Unit (UNMIS, UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP) was established to assist the relevant national institutions in the DDR process. In line with the Integrated DDR Standards, while DPKO is providing guidance for the DDR process as a whole and leading the planning and implementation of the D & D components, UNDP, through voluntary contributions, acts as the planning and implementing agency for the reintegration component. While the UN system may be called upon to provide strategic, technical, operational and financial support to DDR, national and local actors should lead the process. The promotion of national ownership is a principle that guides both policy and the operational design of the DDR Programme carried out with UN support.

In this case, the primary responsibility for the outcome of the programme rests with the national and local actors who are ultimately responsible for the peace, security and development in South Sudan. In order to provide a platform for policy oversight and guidance, the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established by Presidential Decree whilst the Southern Sudan DDR Commissions (SSDDRC) was established to design, implement and manage the DDR process within the country and ensure consistency and compliance with national policies, with support from



the United Nations. The SDDDR State Offices in the ten states coordinate the implementation of DDR activities nationwide.

Specifically, the objective of the DDR Programme is to provide direct support to the eligible participants of 180,000 XCs and associated members (90,000 SAF and 90,000 SPLA), which is part of the CPA implementation and paves the way to future human security, reconstruction and development activities. Due consideration is given to promoting community security and social cohesion through capacity development at local and national levels to ensure the sustainability of the reintegration effort by close monitoring of individual projects and the promotion of close linkages with other government and internationally-supported Programmes.

Guided by the National DDR Strategic Plan (adopted in August 2007), and National Reintegration Policy and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the DDR Programme also aims at contributing to the Northern Sudan's Strategic Five Year Plan (2008 – 2011) and South Sudan's Three Year Strategic Plan for recovery and development, which emphasizes the effective and sustainable reintegration of XCs, while recognizing the need to support Millennium Development Goals in all recovery and development spheres.

The first stage of DDR in Sudan was the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP, 2006 – 2009). The IDDRP aimed to gather baseline information and run pilot projects; it was replaced by the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP, 2009 – 2012). The Sudan DDR Programme (2009-2012) will cater to ex-combatants (XCs) and Special Needs Groups (SNGs) that are either part of or associated with the SAF and SPLA. OAGs were obligated to align to SAF or SPLA by 9 June 2007 to be considered for eligibility. Overall, support will be provided to 180,000 participants, 90,000 in the North and 90,000 in the South. Guided by the National DDR Strategic Plan (adopted in August 2007), and National Reintegration Policy and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the DDR Programme also aims at contributing to the Northern Sudan's Strategic Five Year Plan (2008 – 2011) and South Sudan's Three Year Strategic Plan for recovery and development, which emphasizes the effective and sustainable reintegration of XCs, while recognizing the need to support Millennium Development Goals in all recovery and development spheres.

In January 2009, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) decided to begin Phase I of the SDDRP in Southern Sudan for a caseload of 34,000 persons. As recommended in the National DDR Strategic Plan, the first phase prioritizes the elderly, disabled, female ex-combatants and women associated with the armed forces (WAAF). This group is referred to as the Special Needs Group (SNGs). DDR was officially launched in South Sudan on 10 June 2009 at Mangala, Central Equatoria. In the run to the January 2011 Referendum for self-determination in South Sudan, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) set its priority core functions that includes the Security Sector that is to ensure that mechanisms are in place for transforming the SPLA into a professional army in South Sudan. DDR is positioned as the top priority in the Security Sector in South Sudan. The implementation of the Individual Reintegration Component of the Multi Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme (otherwise known as South Sudan DDR Programme) is supported by UNDP in eight States where demobilization of ex-combatants have been undertaken: 1. Central Equatoria (CES) State, 2. Eastern Equatoria (EES) State, 3. Western Equatoria (WES) State, 4. Lakes State, 5. Western Bhar El Ghazal (WBG) State, 6. Warrap State, 7. Northern Bhar El Ghazal (NBG) State, and 8. Jonglei State.

The South Sudan DDR Programme (SSDDRP), also referred to as CPA-phase DDR Programme, is focused on achieving two mutually reinforcing development objectives. The first objective is to provide support to 33,844 ex-combatants and women associated with armed forces (WAAF) to help them acquire civilian status, gain sustainable income and employment, and reintegrate into their

communities. The second objective is to strengthen the individual and institutional capacity of the South Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC) at the regional and state level, to ensure national ownership, leadership and sustainability of reintegration, and enable UNDP to exit in line with the exit strategy set out in the SDDRP. Both objectives are being actualized through a key Programme Result (Output): "Reintegration of ex-combatants commenced in accordance with the South Sudan DDR Strategic Plan, with support from United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)".

### **Description of Responsibilities**

Purpose:

The overall purpose for the evaluation is to learn from the programme implementation so that lessons can be drawn that can be the basis for instituting improvements to the upcoming new DDR programme planning, design and management. The specific purpose of the evaluation is to measure achievements, outcomes and impacts as well as processes both positive and negative.

The evaluation should include an analysis of synergies between DDR and human security, reconstruction and key human development dimensions, which help support the achievement of the MDGs. Assessment of UNDP in Programme coordination and enhancement of national ownership through capacity building initiatives will be an important component of the evaluation.

Objectives:

The overall objective of this final evaluation is, therefore, to assess, at the end of the Phase I CPA DDR Programme, the extent of attainment of effective and sustainable reintegration of the target XCs; and its link to the wider recovery strategy, including community security, social cohesion, reconstruction and respect for human rights and rule of law in South Sudan.

Specific objectives are to:

- Assess the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the CPA-phase DDR Programme, as well as the sustainability of the Programme from the design and implementation vantage points.
- Assess the Programme/project management capacity and structure of the SDDRC, Implementing Partners and relevant Government bodies who took part in the coordination and management of the Programme.
- Assess the effectiveness of DDR coordination and implementation, and how these have (or have not) contributed to overall progress towards Crisis Prevention and Recovery objectives.
- Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the Programme by reference to the stated Programme outcome and output targets;
- Advise on the suitability of indicators and other verification tools used to measure progress towards outcomes and outputs
- Structure lessons learned process to inform coordination, management and implementation of New National SSDDR Programme

Additional Evaluation Objectives:

In addition to the above, the evaluation of the DDR programme will also:

- Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the Programme by reference to the stated Programme objectives and targets;

- Review the work planning processes: adequacy of annual work plans to guide Programme implementation; adequacy of contractual agreements signed with Implementing Partners and whether such work plan and contracts were discussed and agreed among the key partners (SSDDRC, UNMISS, and Implementing Partners: FAO, IOM, GIZ, the 10 NGOs involved in the DDR Small Grant Mechanism);
- Review and assess the Programme implementation arrangement(s), donor coordination, and monitoring and evaluation modalities of the Programme.
- Identify the staff recruited for the Programme, their expertise, and roles pertaining to capacity building of the SSDDRC as well as implementing partners;
- Identify major institutional, financial and operational issues that have assisted and/or constrained effective implementation of the DDR Programme.

The evaluation will also identify strengths and weaknesses of the DDR Programme in the light of relevant International Standards and best practice in the sector, as well as the particular circumstances of the country. Finally, the evaluation will make recommendations for improvement in the upcoming phases of the DDR, co-ordination, implementation and policies of DDR in South Sudan.

#### Scope and Evaluation Criteria:

The Programme was designed to be implemented over a number of phases. With the Phase I CPA DDR Programme 12,525 beneficiaries across eight states of the South Sudan were disarmed, demobilized for reintegration assistance under the South Sudan DDR Programme as of 2011. The scope of the services provided under the reintegration component of the Programme to be evaluated through the final Programme evaluation includes

- ICRS – Information, Counseling and Referral Services
- Technical Training: Vocational, Small Business, and Agriculture Training support
- Life Skills Training: Civilian Training Package
- Provision of start-up kits
- Provision of follow-up services

The CPA-phase DDR Programme has been implemented in eight (8) states in South Sudan, including Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Jongei, Warrap, Northern Bahr El Gazal, and Western Bahr El'Gazal.

The evaluation will use the following criteria regarding the programme:

- Relevance:
- Efficiency:
- Effectiveness:
- Sustainability:
- Impact:
- Connectedness of the programme to the overall conflict prevention and peace building process in South Sudan.

#### Evaluation Method:

The Final Evaluation of the DDR programme should be participatory involving key stakeholders. In order to achieve a thorough understanding of the Programme and the context, the evaluation review team is expected to employ such participatory techniques as they deem necessary not excluding:

- The evaluation methodology would involve comprehensive and in-depth analysis, and triangulation of data/information from three key information sources on South Sudan DDR Programme: DDR Project documents and Reports; information from stakeholders on DDR; and information and visual observation of performance of ex-combatants who have been provided with economic and social (rehabilitation and medical support) reintegration-support.
- Consultations will be held with key stakeholders to capture the dynamic of information sharing and debate, and to enrich the findings. The consultations will involve a range of stakeholders, including SSDDRC, other relevant government officials, UN agencies, relevant UNDP staff, donors, Implementing Partner NGOs, and XCs, as well as host communities.
- Field visits on the evaluation would target three states with highest concentration of demobilised and reintegrated ex-combatants in South Sudan: Eastern Equatoria State; Jonglei State; and Western Bhar El Ghazal State.

Hence, the evaluation will follow three distinct phases, including

- a) Preparation - review of the Terms of Reference, preliminary desk review, meetings with the UNDP DDR programme and CPRU, and production of Inception Report;
- b) Conduct of the evaluation – mission in the field including meeting with beneficiaries, donors and relevant stakeholders
- c) Follow up – Production of the final Evaluation Report, dissemination of results and organizing stakeholder consultations, development of management response and relevant management actions.

#### **Evaluation outputs:**

The key evaluation outputs include:

- Inception report of the evaluation, which includes the evaluation methodology and evaluation work plan outlining tasks and responsibilities of the evaluation team members (as detailed above).
- Power Point presentation for UNDP, the SSDDRC and other stakeholders on the preliminary findings, lessons learned, and recommendations
- Draft full report covering the issues outlined in the terms of reference and inception report including evaluation findings and conclusions, lessons and recommendations.
- Final evaluation report, which should at a minimum include the following components:
  - Executive summary (maximum 4 pages)
  - Introduction
  - Background (Programme/project description)
  - Evaluation purpose and objective
  - Description of the evaluation methodology
  - Analysis of the situation with regard to outcome, outputs, resources, partnerships, management and working methods and/or implementation strategy
  - Key findings
  - Lessons learnt (from both positive and negative experiences)
  - Constraints that impacted programme delivery
  - Conclusions and practical, actionable recommendations
  - Annexes including
    - ✓ Itinerary
    - ✓ List of persons interviewed
    - ✓ Summary of field visits
    - ✓ List of documents reviewed

- ✓ Client satisfaction survey and/or questionnaire (if any) used and summary of results
- ✓ Any other relevant material that supports evaluation findings and recommendations

### **Evaluation Team Composition:**

The core evaluation team will comprise of two Independent Consultants: an International Consultant (Team Leader), and one National Consultant.

#### **Team Leader** (*International Consultant*)

The *Team Leader* will take a lead role during the evaluation and coordinate the work of all other team members. The team leader will ensure the quality of the evaluation process, outputs, methodology and timely delivery of all products. The team leader, in close collaboration with the other evaluation team members and the UNDP evaluation managers, will take the lead role in conceptualization and design of the evaluation and shaping the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report. The tasks of the team leader include:

- Develops an inception report and details the design, methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis criteria for selection of projects, required resources), and work plan of the evaluation team.
- Directs and conducts the research and analysis of all relevant documentation;
- Decides the division of labour within the evaluation team and coordinates team tasks within the framework of the TORs;
- Oversees and quality assures the preparation of the study and takes a lead in the analysis of the evaluative evidence;
- Oversees the administration, and analysis of the results of the data collection exercise;
- Drafts the evaluation report, and coordinates the inputs from team members;
- Prepares for meetings with UNDP and other stakeholder to review findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- Leads the stakeholder feedback sessions, briefs UNDP on the evaluation through informal sessions and finalizes the report based on feedback from the quality assurance process;
- Delivers the final evaluation report.

### **Indicative Time-frame of the Evaluation:**

The final implementation plan for the evaluation will be outlined in the inception report, but the evaluation will take place over a period of 5 (five) weeks (23 working days for the international consultant and 19 working days for the national consultant).

### **Planning and Implementation Arrangements:**

#### **a. Management of the Evaluation**

CPRU of the UNDP in South Sudan will institute the evaluation manager function which will act as the focal point for managing the evaluation process. The Evaluation Manager will ensure the coordination and liaison with concerned agencies, and ensure the evaluation is conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System.

## **b. Quality Assurance**

The Reference Group will comprise of SSDDRC and UNDP CPRU/DDR staff and will provide oversight of the evaluation process, exercising quality assurance. The Reference Group will play an important role in providing strategic, methodological and substantive advice into the evaluation process as well as a peer review for the key outputs including the main report. Meetings of the Reference Group will be specified in the evaluation work plan.

However, the evaluation will be fully independent and the evaluation team will retain enough flexibility to determine the best approach to collecting and analyzing data for the final evaluation. Ultimately, the findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be those of the evaluation team alone.

### **Reference materials:**

At a minimum, the evaluation team should study and make reference to the following documents during the conduct of the outcome evaluation:

- UNDP Evaluation Policy
- UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
- UNEG Ethical Guidelines For Evaluation
- Evaluation report template and quality standards (UNDP)
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan (2009-2012)
- UNDP Country Programme Document, and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (2009-2012)
- DDR Project Document (2009), and SSDDR Annual Workplans (AWPs) for 2009 – 2012
- UNDP Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) for Sudan (2009-2012)
- South Sudan DDR Quarterly and Annual Reports for 2009 – 2011, Final Review Report (2012); Reports from Implementing Partners; and 2010 DDR Mid-term Evaluation Report.
- DDR Verification mission report (2012) and various monitoring mission reports
- Client Satisfaction Survey Reports
- SSDDR Policy and Strategic Plan Documents
- South Sudan National Development Plan Document
- Other documents and materials related to the outcomes to be evaluated (from the government, donors, etc.)

### **Competencies:**

- Experience with participatory approaches, organizational assessments partnership strategies and capacity development preferred.
- Specific and relevant regional expertise in Africa
- Experience with regional organizations and the UN system in the area of crisis prevention and recovery in general and in DDR in particular.
- Proven experience as an evaluation team leader with ability to lead and work with other evaluation experts.
- Facilitation skills and ability to manage diversity of views in different cultural contexts
- Ability to produce well written reports demonstrating analytical ability and communication skill
- Fluent in English.

### **Qualifications:**

- Master's Degree in a Development or relevant discipline in the Social Sciences.
- At least 10 years of working experience in evaluation of post-conflict recovery Programmes (including Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration projects/ programmes),

## **Annex 2: List of Documents Reviewed**

- UNDP Evaluation Policy
- UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
- UNEG Ethical Guidelines For Evaluation
- Evaluation report template and quality standards (UNDP)
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan (2009-2012)
- UNDP Country Programme Document, and UNDP CPAP (2009-2012)
- DDR Project Document (2009), & SSDDR Annual Work Plans (AWPs) for 2009 – 2012
- UNDP Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) for Sudan ( 2009-2012)
- South Sudan DDR Quarterly and Annual Reports for 2009 – 2011;
- Reports from Implementing Partners;
- 2010 DDR Mid-term Evaluation Report;
- DDR Verification mission report (2012) and various monitoring mission reports;
- Client Satisfaction Survey Reports;
- SSDDR Policy and Strategic Plan Documents; and
- South Sudan National Development Plan Document.

## Annex 3: List of Persons Consulted

S/N	Institution	Name of Person Consulted	Title/Position	Location/State
<b>South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Offices (SSDDRC)</b>				
<b>SSDDRC Head Quarters, Juba</b>				
1	SSDDRC (HQs)	William Deng Deng	Chairperson	Juba
2		Majur Naylor Machar	Deputy Chairperson	Juba
3		Ambrose Kambaya	Member	Juba
4		Obwaha Claude Akashas	D.G., Admin. & Finance	Juba
5		Jerome Barikue	D.G., Programmes	Juba
6		Peter Garang Ngor	D/Director, Procurement and Logistics	Juba
7		Evans Erua Gama	Director, HIV/AHIS (A/g)	Juba
8		Rev. Saturnino Ladu	Director, Reintegration	Juba
9		Samuel Yerima	Director, Programmes	Juba
10		Simon Duobol	M&E Officer	Juba
11		Achil Athian Teng	Disability Officer	Juba
12		Athian Athian Yai	Special Needs Officer	Juba
<b>State DDRC Office, Juba, CES</b>				
1	SSDDRC, Juba	Jennifer Lugor Yatta	State Coordinator (A/g)	Juba/CES
2		Rev.Compeo Yuggu Wani	Inspector for Reintegration	Juba/CES
3		Samuel Buga Edward	A/Director, M&E	Juba/CES
<b>State DDRC Office, Torit, EES</b>				
1	SSDDRC, Torit	Achomo Mary Buyu	State Coordinator	Torit/EES
2		Ajok Francis Laboke	Finance & Admin. Officer	Torit/EES
3		Achire John Okot	M&E Officer	Torit/EES
4		Gabriel Sebit Justin	Special Needs Officer	Torit/EES
5		Semira Charles	Admin. Assistant	Torit/EES
<b>State DDRC Office, Bor, JS</b>				
1	SSDDRC, Bor	Michael Malual Wuar	State Coordinator	Bor/JS
2		John Reech Jurkuch	Reintegration Officer	Bor/JS
<b>State DDRC Office, Rumbek LS</b>				
1	SSDDRC, Rumbek	Meen Mawut Nyot	State Coordinator	Rumbek/LS
2		Chawnoc Nhial Alit	Reintegration Officer	Rumbek/LS
3		John Chol Maker	MIS Officer	Rumbek/LS
4		Khal Mapuor Aterdit	PI Officer	Rumbek/LS
<b>State DDRC Office, Wau, WBGS</b>				
1	SSDDRC, Wau	William Tong Urua	State Coordinator	Wau/WBGS
2		Alier John Atem	PI Officer	Wau/WBGS
3		Francis Nyibang John	M&E Officer	Wau/WBGS
<b>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</b>				
1	UNDP Country Office	Bala'zs Harvaith	Country Director	Juba
2		Amanuel Gebremdhin	Chief, CPRU	Juba
3		Ganiyu Ipaye	Project Manager, DDR	Juba
4		Martin Dramani	Programme Specialist, CPRU	Juba



5		Seifealem Demeke	Finance Specialist, CPRU	Juba	
6		Patience Alidri	Planning Specialist, CPRU	Juba	
<b>United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS)</b>					
1	UNMISS HQs	Ould Sidi M.Zahabi	Chief, UNMISS DDR Unit	Juba	
2		Nahataba Kowab	Deputy Chief, UNMISS DDR Unit	Juba	
<b>UNMISS State Offices</b>					
1	UNMISS State Offices	Chandrasekhar Pakala	Associate DDR Officer	Torit/EES	
2		Lexton Sebit	DDR Prog. Assistant	Torit/EES	
1		Oliwde Onideyi	DDR Officer	Bor/JS	
2		Adebayo Oyokunle	DDR Officer	Bor/JS	
3		Jacinto B. De Vera	DDR Officer	Bor/JS	
1		Samantha Perera	Head, State UNMISS DDR	Rumbek/LS	
2		Dr. Henry	DDR Officer	Rumbek/LS	
1		Alemayo Birbirs	DDR Officer	Wau/WBGS	
<b>DDR Implementing Partners</b>					
<b>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)</b>					
1	FAO HQs	Sue Lautze	Head of Office	Juba/CES	
2		Rajendra Aryal	D/Head of Office	Juba/CES	
3	FAO Rumbek	Phanuel Adwera	Field Coordinator, Rumbek	Rumbek/LS	
<b>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</b>					
1	IOM HQs	Matt Huber	Programme Manager	Juba	
2	IOM State Offices	Abraham Mayen	Reintegration Officer	Wau/WBGS	
<b>South Sudan Older People's Organization (SSOPO)</b>					
1	SSOPO HQs	Donato Ochan Hakim	Executive Director	Juba/CES	
2		Sebit Tom Emmanuel	Project Officer	Juba/CES	
<b>Church and Development (C&amp;D)</b>					
1	C&D HQs	Rev. Dr. Stephen Mathiang	Executive Director	Bor/JS	
2		John Bullen Allier	Program Coordinator	Bor/JS	
<b>Action Africa Help International (AAH)</b>					
1	AAH HQs	Asimwe Innocent	Senior Programme Manager	Juba	
<b>Humane Development Council (HDC)</b>					
1	HDC HQs	Joseph Simiyu	Project Manager	Juba	
2		Sara Samoei	Admin./Finance Officer	Juba	
3		Garang Deng Akot	Social Worker	Juba	
4		Rebecca Lokoli	Community Mobiliser	Juba	
5		Viola Odera	Admin. Assistant	Juba	
<b>CEFA</b>					
1	CEFA HQs	Giulio Doronzo	Country Director	Rumbek/LS	
<b>Diar for Rehabilitation and Development Association (DRDA)</b>					
1	DRDA HQs	Perez	Programme Coordinator	Rumbek/LS	
2		David	Project Orricer	Rumbek/LS	

<b>Messianic Community in South Sudan (MECOSS)</b>				
1	MECOSS	John Matur Mariel	Project Officer	Rumbek/LS
<b>World Concern Development Organization (WCDO)</b>				
1	WCDO HQs	Jairus Lihanda	DDR Training manager/Focal Person	Wau/WBGS
<b>Don Bosco Vocational Training Center (Don Bosco)</b>				
1	DON BOSCO	Fr. Sunil Orthel	Director for Admin. & Training	Wau/WBGS
<b>Juba Medical Center</b>				
1	JMC	Dr. Wani Mena Gindalang	Specialist/Ophthalmologist	Juba/CES
<b>Tailoring Training Center</b>				
1	TTC	Agnes Oyo Otim	Trainer/Owner	Torit/EES
<b>Zumoto Computer Center</b>				
1	Zumoto	Richard	Trainer/Owner	Torit/EES
<b>Line Ministries and Other Government Institutions</b>				
<b>Line Ministries and Other Government Institutions, Torit, EES</b>				
1	Ministry of Information & Telecommunication	Hon. Felix Otuduha Siro	Minister	Torit/EES
2	Ministry of Education	Hon. Michael Lopuke Lotyam	Minister	Torit/EES
3	Ministry of Social Dvpt, Gender & Child Welfare	Jane Gama Surur	Ag/Director, Child Welfare Department	Torit/EES
<b>Line Ministries and Other Government Institutions, Bor, Jonglei State</b>				
1	Ministry of Social Dvpt, Gender & Child Welfare	Majok Kur Nhial	D/G, Social Development	Bor/JS
2		Thon majok Deng	Director, Admin. & Finance	Bor/JS
3	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	Hon. Mayen Ngor Atem	Minister	Bor/JS
<b>Line Ministries and Other Government Institutions, Rumbek, Lakes State</b>				
1	Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement	Hon. Benjamin Makuer Mabor	Minister	Rumbek/LS
1	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources & Fisheries	Hon. Benjamin Laat	Minister	Rumbek/LS
2		Paul Maker Degal	Director General	Rumbek/LS
3		Benjamin Mading	Director of Production	Rumbek/LS

<b>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Irrigation, Wau, Western Bhar el Ghazal State</b>				
1	MAFI	Karlo Kamillo	Director General	Wau/WBGS
<b>The Donor Community In Juba</b>				
<b>The World Bank, Juba</b>				
1	WB	Khetsiwe Dlamini	Senior Country Operations Officer	Juba
1	WB	Abdurahim Fraji	World Bank, Kenya	Nairobi
2		Akii Stravo	M&E Specialist	Juba
<b>Office of the Embassy of Canada, Juba</b>				
1	CIDA	Nancy J. Foster	First Secretary, Development	Juba
<b>Liaison Office of the Government of Japan, Juba</b>				
1	Japan Liaison Office	Ryo Ishikawa	Second Secretary	Juba
<b>KfW – (German Aid ), Juba</b>				
1	KfW	Carla Berke	KfW Representative	Juba
<b>UKaid (DFID), Juba</b>				
1	UKaid/ Dept. for International Devpt	Sonia Warner	Senior Governance Advisor	Juba
<b>Key Informant</b>				
1	B.I.C.C.	Wolf-Christian Paes	Head of Section, Advisory	Juba
<b>Key Informants: XCs and SNGs, Juba, CES</b>				
S/N	Name		Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Godfree Sisto		Male	Driving
2	Joice Dudu Ajo		Female	Hair Dressing
3	Amanuel Paul		Male	Small Business
4	John Laku		Male	Welding
<b>Focus Group Discussions With DDR Beneficiaries in Juba, CES</b>				
<b>Small Business Group:</b>				
S/N	Name		Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Ngaidok Korok		F	Small Business/Kiosk
2	Martha Amor		F	Small Business/Kiosk
3	Theresa Ngalukudung		F	Small Business/Kiosk
4	Kwata Lotuka Lowiryen		F	Small Business/Kiosk
5	Ngaidok Ngarithan Thotho		M	Small Business/Kiosk
6	Barlama		F	Small Business/Kiosk
7	Rosho Jakin		F	Small Business/Kiosk

8	Albino Thunyang	M	SB – Airtime Vendor
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**Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with DDR Beneficiaries in Torit, EES**

**Tailoring and Small Business Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Susana Aluku	F	Tailoring
2	Sunday Kuku	F	Tailoring
3	Oyela Consy	F	Tailoring
4	Stephen Oriema Lodu	M	Tailoring
5	Martha Vigilio	F	Small Business

**Computer Skills and Driving Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Oyiti Benson	M	Computer Skills
2	Jacob Nimir	M	Computer Skills
3	Suzan George	F	Computer Skills
4	James Achul Glario	M	Driving
5	Godfree Sisto	M	Driving

**Special needs/Disability Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Vigilio Oluhi Rufino	M	General Shop
2	Santo Okwahi Fidensio	M	Welding
3	John Oruma Oyum	M	Phone Charging

**Mechanical Training Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Okech David Toni	M	Mechanics
2	Drici Geoffrey	M	Mechanics
3	John Kulang Muranga	M	Mechanics
4	Silversto Okwa	M	Mechanics

**Focus Group Discussion With Beneficiaries, Bor, Jonglei State**

**Small Business, Livestock and Carpentry Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Achiek Gueek Jok	F	Small Business
2	Mary Amer Achuil	F	Small Business
3	Deng Malual Ron	M	Small Business
4	Ajol Ajol Thonbor	M	Small Business
5	Achol Mach Achol	F	Livestock
6	Kong Gai	M	Carpentry

**Focus Group Discussion With DDR Beneficiaries in Rumbek, Lakes State**

**Agriculture and Small Business Group (MECOSS):**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Kur Bol Makuei	M	Agriculture
2	Kan Major Padier	M	Agriculture
3	Maurwel Magom Achien	M	Agriculture
4	Dor Dinaker Mayen	F	Agriculture
5	Yar Makoi Magol	M	Agriculture
6	Roda Adut Upiny	F	Small Business
7	John Mathiang malual	M	Agriculture/SB
8	Helena Akot madding	F	Small Business
9	Adol Mabor Chol	F	Agriculture

**Agriculture Group (DRDA):**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Rebecca Ayiei Deng	F	Agric./Ox Plough
2	Joseph Mabor makur	M	Agric./Ox plough
3	Manyol Mapur Machiek	M	Agric./Ox Plough
4	Makur Mayuol Jiel	M	Agric./Ox Plough

**Key Informants: XCs and SNGs Wau, WBGS**

1	Mohammed Alteib Suleiman	Male	Restaurant
2	Makal Malek	Female	Small Business
3	Achol Makur Anguak	Female	Small Business
4	Martha Adut Duop	Female	Restaurant
5	John Arop Nyol	Male	Driving

**Focus Group Discussions with DDR Beneficiaries in Wau, WBGS**

**Small Business & Agriculture Group:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Batista Selivia Rihan	M	Small Business
2	Nyorko Tut Wor	F	Small Business
3	Rebecca Kuei Philip	F	Agriculture
4	Akon Lou Piny	F	Small Business
5	Adhieu Magok Deng	F	Small Business
6	Mayok Gol Jak	M	SB/Phone Charging
7	Nyacin Mabel Tut	F	Small Business
8	Yar Makuoc Biet	F	Small Business

**Focus Group Discussion with DDR Beneficiaries in Mapel, WBG**

**Small Business Group of WAAF:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Livelihood Option
1	Mary Simon Louis	F	SB/Restaurant
2	Regina Athiang Deng	F	SB/Restaurant
3	Awa Richard Nyibang	F	SB/Restaurant
4	Akec Manhiem Kot	F	SB/Restaurant
5	Awun Tong Bella	F	SB/Restaurant
6	Elizabeth Aliba Udo	F	SB/Restaurant

**Meeting with Host community in Mapel, WBGS****Boma Administrator, Chiefs and Elders of the Host Community:**

S/N	Name	Sex	Position/Title
1	Daniel Dinin Dinin	M	Boma Administrator
2	Achan Ungom Ukelo	F	Women Rep.
3	Aleu Akol Aleu	M	Community Member
4	Udom Kon Umeda	M	Community Chief
5	Claude Thony Ubur	M	Community Chief
6	Uyu Nguar Kot	M	Community Chief
7	Marko Madut Nyong	M	Community Chief
8	March Wol Geng	M	Community Chief
9	Martin Piem Lual	M	Community Member

**Meeting with Community Members in Torit, EES****Representatives of Local CSO (Torit County Tirrangori Association):**

S/N	Name	Sex	Position/Title
1	Leonard George Shallin	M	Chairperson
2	Nartisio Asayo Siro	M	Secretary